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ABSTRACT 
 The June 5, 1976, Teton Dam collapse occurred in a unique region of Idaho where 
the population comprised as much as ninety-five percent of residents belonging to The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.  The homogenous nature of this population 
influenced the nature of the recovery effort following the disaster.  The Teton Dam 
recovery effort provided an opportunity for the LDS church, using its welfare system and 
priesthood (lay male leadership) organizational structure to seamlessly work with 
government agencies.  Church leaders used the reports of positive interactions between 
its members and the federal and local leaders to celebrate an effective assimilation of its 
principles into mainstream culture, even using distinctive aspects of Mormon culture and 
practice to enhance the government’s recovery efforts.  While the Teton Dam failure did 
encourage a previously unprecedented level of cooperation between the federal or local 
government and the LDS Church, this recovery effort also demonstrated an inability or 
unwillingness of the church to actually abandon its unique beliefs and procedures. 
 The dam collapse allowed for a potential point of change in a larger narrative of 
Mormon history noted by mutual antagonism between the church and government.  This 
change is a matter of perception by members of the church and their leadership during the 
late 1970s.  Much of the accommodation arose from the secular agencies that felt it easier 
to adapt to the LDS recovery approach rather than implement their own methods of 
organization.  This environmental crisis provided an opportunity for the LDS Church in 
1976 to display its beliefs and practices, which the federal government and mainstream 
 vii 
American culture had historically found objectionable.  The recovery period provided an 
opportunity for the church to create a narrative based on its work following the collapse 
of the dam that showed the value of priesthood leadership, welfare system, communal 
spirit, and the doctrine of self-sufficiency. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 The first Saturday of June, 1976, brought sunshine and warmth, drawing the 
people of the Upper Snake River Valley outside to enjoy the spring weather.  Ferron W. 
Sonderegger, a resident of Sugar City, Idaho and a stake president in the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints of the Rexburg North Stake, spent the morning working in his 
garden planting raspberries and strawberries.  The little neighbor girls, Yvonne and Diane 
Bean, ran to the Sonderegger house finding the stake president on his knees in the garden 
and exclaimed, “Brother Sonderegger, the dam has broken.  The Teton Dam has broken.”  
In disbelief Sonderegger told the girls that he thought they were only joking, but agreed 
to go next door where he heard a radio announcer implore his listeners to “Move out, the 
dam has broken.  Don’t stop for anything.  Move out.”1 
 Workers completed much of the construction on the Teton Dam shortly before an 
abnormally heavy spring thaw flooded into the new reservoir.  They had yet to finish the 
spillway or river works outlet, which allowed engineers to control how much water the 
reservoir held.  When workers fell slightly behind schedule on construction projects the 
delay only compounded other, more fundamental dam problems.  The dam site utilized 
porous canyon walls riddled with large fissures that required a novel design approach.  
The site also resided in an area prone to frequent seismic activity that could jeopardize 
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 Ferron W. Sonderegger, interviewed by Bruce Blumell, July 6, 1976, box 2, vol. 1, page 
42, MSSI 2, Teton Dam Collection, Brigham Young University-Idaho Special 
Collections, David O. McKay Library, Brigham Young University-Idaho, Rexburg, 
Idaho. 
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the integrity of the dam.  Eastern Idahoans and the Bureau of Reclamation debated for 
decades the necessity of a dam on the Teton River.  This dam ultimately provided little 
additional irrigation water and flood control to an area that did not routinely suffer from 
severe flooding, making the necessity of taking such risks in the site and design a dubious 
choice for such a minor reward.  The questionable site, the Bureau’s inability to 
adequately address the challenges of the canyon walls in their design, and record level 
snowpack in 1975-76 came to a head on June 5 when the face of the dam suddenly 
collapsed and unleashed its reservoir on several eastern Idaho towns and communities. 
 The ensuing flood took eleven lives, inundated over 180 square miles, destroyed 
771 homes, damaged 3,002 additional homes, and killed 16,650 livestock.2  Flood 
victims in Sugar City, Rexburg, Wilford, Salem, and Hibbard found themselves 
homeless, possessing only the items that they quickly assembled before evacuating to 
higher ground.  For many this meant only the clothes they wore that day.  Poor 
understanding of the Teton River Canyon and arrogance on the part of the Bureau’s 
design of the dam led to two billion dollars’ worth of damage in one of the worst dam 
disasters in the region.3 
 The Teton Dam disaster occurred in an area of eastern Idaho where nearly ninety-
five percent of the population claimed membership in The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints (often referred to as Mormons) according to the 1976 LDS Church 
                                                 
 
2
 Wayne J. Graham, “The Teton Dam Failure—An Effective Warning and Evacuation” 
(paper presented at the Association of State Dam Safety Officials 25th Anniversary 
Conference, Indian Wells, California, September 7-11, 2008), 2. 
 
3
 Marc Reisner, Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its Disappearing Water (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1993), 407. 
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Historian Bruce D. Blumell.4  The homogenous nature of the population involved in this 
disaster and its recovery effort provides an unprecedented modern look at Mormon 
interactions with the federal government.  Hostility and mutual antagonism marked the 
relationship between the LDS Church and federal and local governments from the mid-
nineteenth century through the early decades of the twentieth century.  This enmity 
played out on both a national and a local stage, primarily through legal battles involving 
polygamy and church owned businesses.  Historians Leonard Arrington and Davis Bitton, 
in their work, The Mormon Experience: A History of the Latter-day Saints argued that the 
twentieth century brought a certain amount of accommodation of American government 
and culture by the LDS Church.  The church ended polygamy in 1890, divested itself of 
its controlling interest in many of its businesses, began participating in national political 
parties, and ended its cooperative economic systems.  These changes to Mormonism 
ended most of the legal wrangling between the church and government.  Arrington and 
Bitton concluded, “the church was, in effect, reoriented to incorporate the standards of 
social, political, and economic behavior imposed by American Society, while at the same 
time it attempted to retain as much of the ‘Kingdom’ outlook as possible.”5 
                                                 
 
4
 The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints prefers to be described using its full 
name rather than being called the Mormon Church.  In this thesis, I will use the term 
Mormon Church because those outside the church commonly employ this name.  In 
addition to Mormon Church, I will use LDS Church or simply the church when 
describing The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.  I will refer to people 
belonging to this church as Mormons, LDS, Saints, or members.  “Style Guide—The 
Name of the Church,” The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2013.  
http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/style-guide (accessed July 26, 2013).  Bruce D. 
Blumell, “The LDS Response to the Teton Dam Disaster in Idaho,” Sunstone Magazine, 
(March-April, 1980): 40, https://www.sunstonemagazine.com/wp-content-
uploads/sbi/articles/020-35-42.pdf (accessed August 29, 2011): 35. 
 
5
 Leonard J. Arrington and Davis Bitton, The Mormon Experience: A History of the 
Latter-day Saints, 2nd ed., (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 251. 
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 For Arrington and Bitton, this attempt to maintain the distinctive fundamentals of 
Mormonism while changing elements of the church to adapt to mainstream American 
culture actually led to only superficial modifications.  Original nineteenth century church 
principles that made Mormonism unique among other American sects undermined any 
apparent changes in later years.  The Mormon Experience argues that this failure to fully 
integrate into American culture manifests itself in the church’s heavy influence on 
members’ lives, continuing commitment to economic cooperation with the rise of their 
welfare system, and the homogenous political makeup of the membership.6  Interactions 
between the Mormon Church and various government agencies allow for a modern case 
study that supports Arrington and Bitton’s argument.  The Teton Dam recovery effort 
orchestrated by the LDS Church demonstrated an event in Mormon history where the 
church believed it had once again worked to accommodate American culture and 
government, thereby further improving relations between itself and the government.  Yet, 
deeper analysis reveals that the Mormon experiences of the Teton Dam recovery period 
confirm Arrington and Bitton’s assertions involving Mormon adaptations to American 
culture as largely superficial.  
 The recovery effort following the collapse of the Teton Dam provided an 
opportunity for eastern Idaho leaders and members of The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints to change their historic perception of a mutually antagonistic 
relationship with the federal government.  Based on their performance following the 
disaster, the church believed it had successfully worked to improve its interactions with 
government agencies and ended hostile attitudes on both sides.  Teton provided an 
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 Arrington, The Mormon Experience, 252-253. 
  
5 
opportunity for the LDS church, using its welfare system and priesthood (lay male 
leadership) organizational structure to seamlessly work with the government agencies 
sent to help flood victims in eastern Idaho.  Church leaders used the positive interactions 
between its members and the federal and local leaders to celebrate an effective 
assimilation of its principles into mainstream culture, even using distinctive aspects of 
Mormon culture and practice to enhance the government’s recovery efforts.  While the 
Teton Dam failure did encourage a previously unprecedented level of cooperation 
between the federal or local government and the LDS Church, this recovery effort also 
demonstrated an inability or unwillingness of the church to actually abandon its unique 
beliefs and procedures. 
 An example of the church insisting on its religious tenets dictating its behavior 
during the recovery period is manifested when LDS flood victims relied first on the 
church to meet most of their needs during the summer of 1976.  The church welfare 
system arrived immediately following the floodwaters to provide for the most basic 
material needs of the victims.  LDS welfare services stayed several months to supply 
food and other goods to the eastern Idahoans affected by the disaster.  In addition to the 
provisions presented by the church’s welfare program, the Red Cross set up a base of 
operations in Idaho Falls to assist victims.  However, the majority of the Mormon 
residents believed they could not utilize the Red Cross because it violated the church’s 
stance on the need to maintain self-sufficiency and avoid “handouts.”  Mormon victims 
also underused food stamps from the government because they viewed them as a kind of 
“dole” system about which their doctrinal beliefs had warned them.  The First Presidency 
(the highest governing body of the church) eventually released a statement clarifying 
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their position on government assistance, subsidies, and loans in the case of the Teton 
Dam disaster, allowing members to avail themselves of these services.  Yet, even after 
this advice from the leadership of the church, many members found it difficult to utilize 
any aid not offered by the church, and reverted to a trend of wariness toward outside 
institutions, especially the federal government. 
  Even when using government agencies, local church leaders mediated 
interactions between eastern Idaho Mormons and federal relief agencies, maintaining the 
top down leadership style characteristic of the Mormon Church from its inception.  The 
local priesthood holders also organized a widespread cleanup effort to remove the mud 
and debris from homes in the flood zone with volunteers from Idaho, Wyoming, and 
Utah, preferring not to wait for any type of direction on this matter from government 
agencies that arrived later.  Local priesthood leaders also monitored all of the work done 
in Rexburg and Sugar City by church volunteers or government agencies, which they 
planned and discussed in priesthood correlation meetings occurring every morning for 
approximately the first six weeks following the disaster.  Agencies such as the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) agreed that using the Mormon priesthood system streamlined their 
process and worked amicably with the local church leaders.  While this arrangement 
between the priesthood and outside agencies made the recovery period one of the most 
efficient following any disaster in the United States, it demonstrated an unwillingness by 
the church to fully submit to any government agency and allow it to function without 
oversight by the priesthood.  
 The dam collapse allowed for a potential point of change in a larger narrative of 
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Mormon history noted by mutual antagonism between the church and government.  This 
change is a matter of perception by members of the church and their leadership during the 
late 1970s.  The nature of the sources available regarding exchanges between church 
leaders and representatives of government agencies does not yield quantifiable data that 
confirms actual changes to church policy and behavior.  The oral histories also do not 
yield a balanced amount of information regarding reactions by non-Mormons and 
government employees toward Mormon control of the recovery effort during this period.  
These sources focus largely on Mormon responses to the collapse of the dam, the way the 
church and government addressed the recovery effort, and how they believed this 
changed the church and its relationship with the government.   
 The analysis in this thesis relies heavily on these oral history interviews 
conducted by Ricks College (now Brigham Young University-Idaho), Utah State 
University, and LDS Church historians in the years immediately following the collapse of 
the dam.  Ricks College combined some of these oral histories into a collection entitled 
That Day in June: Reflections on the Teton Dam Disaster, but most of the interviews 
reside as transcripts in BYU-Idaho’s Teton Dam Collection, the largest repository of 
documents pertaining to the dam.  Basing the argument of this thesis on largely Mormon 
oral histories may seem problematic as many of the interviewees describe their subjective 
reactions and religious beliefs as factual.  However, my argument evaluates the 
perceptions of Mormon members and leaders and their analysis of the recovery effort.  
For this stated purpose, the largely unused Teton Dam oral history collection provides an 
excellent resource to capture the response of the LDS Church membership to the events 
following the disaster and adds needed analysis to the existing Teton Dam scholarship.  
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Another potential problem arises from interviews performed by Bruce Blumell, LDS 
Church Historian during the Teton Dam recovery period.  Facing a Mormon interviewer, 
some interviewees may have sensed that they could not be entirely objective or critical of 
the LDS Church or its members.  Government or Red Cross representatives represented a 
small non-Mormon minority in eastern Idaho, and may have thought it necessary to 
respond positively to Blumell about their interactions with the LDS Church. 
 Historians Marc Reisner and Donald Worster have produced compelling accounts 
of the collapse of the Teton Dam in the context of examining water management in the 
western U.S.  Reisner and Worster both view the Teton Dam disaster as an unqualified 
failure of the Bureau of Reclamation caused by the hubris of this institution and the 
clamoring greed for water by westerners.  My thesis does not delve into a larger 
examination of western water management or the Bureau of Reclamation and its role in 
Teton.  Cadillac Desert and Rivers of Empire, by Reisner and Worster respectively, are 
the definitive works on these issues.  In these narratives addressing dams and irrigation in 
the West, both Worster and Reisner discussed the relationship between Mormons and 
dam building and cast it in a negative light.  My work here builds on their assessment by 
tying their analysis of Mormons to the Teton Dam specifically and continuing beyond the 
dam disaster.   
 Mormon historians have also analyzed the Teton Dam disaster as a part of a larger 
picture of Mormonism in America.  Leonard Arrington, Davis Bitton, and F. Ross 
Peterson used Teton to celebrate the recovery effort executed by the LDS Church as a 
positive chapter in Mormon history.  The analysis in this thesis agrees that Teton was 
both a catastrophic event for eastern Idaho and the Bureau while providing the LDS 
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Church with an opportunity to prove the value and effectiveness of its welfare system and 
priesthood leadership.  However, further evaluation of the sources used reveals a more 
nuanced judgment of the Mormon-led recovery effort.  The success of the church resulted 
not only from its laudatory efforts but also from an unprecedented level of 
accommodation of the church’s practices and beliefs by government and other agencies 
during the recovery period.  The LDS Church concluded it achieved its stated goal of 
improving its public image with its welfare system and doctrine of self-reliance following 
the collapse of the dam.  Nevertheless, without the cooperation and willingness of the 
other organizations involved, the church could have returned to the historically 
antagonistic relationship that marked its earlier interactions with the federal government.   
 While this thesis looks directly at Mormonism and how its distinctive beliefs and 
leadership hierarchy influenced the recovery effort, it is not a direct analysis of Mormon 
doctrine.  I have utilized the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Writing Center’s 
article “Religious Studies,” and the article “A Guide to Writing in Religious Studies” by 
Faye Halpern, et al. to make a distinction between a doctrinal evaluation of Mormonism, 
which this thesis is not, and a historical look at a religious group, which is the approach I 
employed.  These sources also provide excellent information and instruction for 
historians looking at religious sources and guidance for maintaining objectivity in the 
overall analysis of an event that involves a religious group.7  Many of the personal 
accounts I rely on speak in religious tones and terminology unique to the LDS Church 
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 Faye Halpern, et al.  A Guide to Writing in Religious Studies.  The President and 
Fellows of Harvard College, 2007.  The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
Writing Center.  “Religious Studies,”   
http://writingcenter.unc.edu/handouts/religious-studies/, (accessed March 6, 2013). 
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and I will endeavor to make it clear to the reader that this is the interviewee’s perspective.  
 Many of the individuals whose experiences I analyze were both local leaders in 
the Mormon Church and in local government or business and provide the exclusive 
vantage point of expressing a valid assessment of Mormon interactions with 
representatives of government agencies.  All of the Madison County Commissioners and 
Civil Defense leaders belonged to the LDS Church and held leadership positions within 
the church.  They worked in both their civil and religious positions without making a 
distinction between the two roles.8  These men believed that they participated in a turning 
point in Mormon history where Mormons and the U.S. government both worked toward 
and achieved a more amicable relationship and ended more than a century’s worth of 
reciprocated antagonism.   
 The first chapter of this thesis establishes the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century struggles between the LDS Church and local and federal government.  The 
second chapter addresses the longstanding relationship between Mormons and the Teton 
Dam, where the supposed need for the dam, the construction phase, and its eventual 
collapse are treated.  The third chapter examines the historiography surrounding this 
disaster from its place in the narrative of western water management to its role in 
Mormon history.  The LDS Welfare system’s contributions following the disaster and its 
intense desire to protect the members and church from too much reliance on outside 
agencies comprise the analysis in chapter four.  The fifth chapter looks into the use of the 
local priesthood leadership to coordinate the recovery efforts of the church and other 
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 T. Bardell Klingler, interviewed by Bruce Blumell, July 5, 1976, box 2, vol. 1, page 
154, MSSI 2, BYUISC.  Mark G. Ricks, interviewed by Bruce Blumell, July 5, 1976, box 
2, vol. 1, page 1, MSSI 2, BYUISC.  Ferron W. Sonderegger, interviewed by Bruce 
Blumell, July 6, 1976, box 2, vol. 1, page 37, MSSI 2, BYUISC.   
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agencies outside the church.  The massive volunteer effort that chapter six explores 
depicts the belief by many priesthood leaders in eastern Idaho that church members had a 
wide variety of assets to draw upon in a disaster scenario and could, in future situations, 
maintain an even greater level of independence from other organizations.  
 The money, provisions, and time donated by the LDS Church to the recovery 
efforts in eastern Idaho in 1976 undoubtedly contributed to a more efficient rebuilding 
period that allowed the victims to restore their damaged lives more quickly.  Members of 
the church claimed to have the faith they placed in the policies and doctrines espoused by 
their religion confirmed.  Local and general leadership concluded that they carried out 
their responsibilities in such a way as to secure a more positive image from those outside 
the church.  This environmental crisis provided an opportunity for the LDS Church in 
1976 to showcase its beliefs and practices, which the federal government and mainstream 
American culture had historically found objectionable.  It also allowed the church to 
create a narrative based on its work following the collapse of the dam, which showed the 
value of its priesthood leadership, welfare system, communal spirit, and the doctrine of 
self-sufficiency. 
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CHAPTER 2: A “CONFLICT BETWEEN SOVEREIGNS” 
 
 The distinctive traits of Mormonism discussed in this thesis emerged in the 1840s.  
Fleeing persecution and facing a daunting crossing in unknown territory reinforced the 
priority of the LDS community over the individual and the submission to the authority of 
strong leaders.  Donald Worster, in Rivers of Empire, argued that this emphasis on group 
welfare, which went directly against the popular Jeffersonian notion that glorified self-
sufficient farmers, would not have developed in some of the Mormons’ earlier homes in 
New York, Ohio, Illinois, or Missouri.  Believing that members would quickly leave 
when tempted with easy opportunities to make their own way, Worster asserted that the 
trek to Utah solidified the Mormon ideal of community and allowed its members to 
submit to the church hierarchy in the pursuit of collective success.  “In Utah, the Church 
had an excellent environment for creating an agrarian society ruled by a central power.  
There the hierarchy could insist […] on cohesion, dominance, and discipline.”9  This 
“cohesion, dominance, and discipline” followed the Saints north to eastern Idaho and 
forward one hundred and thirty years later to the time of the Teton Dam disaster.10 
 Not long after the murder of Joseph Smith, founder and first president of the LDS 
Church, at Carthage Jail in the summer of 1844, Brigham Young assumed the leadership 
                                                 
 
9
 Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American 
West, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 80-81.  
 
10
 Within the LDS Church, the term “Saints” indicates members.  Those in the early 
church employed the term heavily when describing the membership.  James K. Lyon, 
“Saints,” Encyclopedia of Mormonism, Daniel H. Ludlow, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 
1992), 1149-1150.   
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of the main congregation of the church.11  Early in Young’s tenure as president of the 
church, he realized the necessity of moving his followers out of Nauvoo, Illinois where 
they continued to endure persecution by outsiders.  Young researched land that belonged 
to Mexico until the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.  Under escalating pressure from 
local mobs and government officials, Young and his followers began to leave their homes 
in search of a peaceful existence in the West.  The exodus involved several thousand 
miles of arduous travel to a destination largely unknown.12  Upon entering the Salt Lake 
Valley in present-day Utah in 1847, Young believed he had found their sanctuary and 
members quickly began to make it their home. 
 The isolation and their work in irrigation (discussed in the following chapter) 
allowed Mormons in Utah to flourish.  Their success encouraged the church to expand its 
borders by establishing new settlements radiating out from the Salt Lake Valley.  Thomas 
E. Ricks, a convert to the LDS Church in the latter half of the nineteenth century, worked 
on the Northern Pacific Railroad.  These experiences with the railroad allowed him to 
travel through the Upper Snake River Valley, where he eventually led a Mormon 
colonization effort in 1882.13  Ricks contacted church president, John Taylor, to inform 
him of his intentions to form a colony in the Idaho territory, which he called Rexburg.  
President Taylor advised him to avoid antagonizing non-Mormons and Native Americans 
already settled in the area.  He encouraged Ricks to follow the successful pattern of 
Mormon colonization employed by the church for thirty years by forming a close-knit 
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 Arrington and Bitton, The Mormon Experience, 80-81. 
 
12
 Arrington and Bitton, The Mormon Experience, 95-96. 
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 David L. Crowder, Rexburg, Idaho: The First One Hundred Years, 1883-1983, 
(Caldwell, ID: Caxton Printers, 1983), 11. 
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community.  This strategy allowed for two obvious benefits, the first because close 
proximity would make gathering together for religious meetings easier and the second 
allowed for a collective approach to finances, irrigation, security, and other secular 
matters.14 
 Shortly after its formation, Rexburg experienced a rash of anti-Mormon sentiment 
from Idaho courts, government, and residents.  An anti-Mormon jury subjected Thomas 
Ricks to a lengthy trial and sentenced him to a term in the territorial prison for polygamy 
in 1889.  President Wilford Woodruff issued a Manifesto prohibiting future polygamous 
unions in 1890, causing the Idaho court to lose interest in Ricks’ case and set the 
conviction aside.15  Law enforcement found it difficult to apprehend and prosecute 
polygamists and soon lost interest in this method of provoking Mormons.  Anti-Mormon 
sentiment in Idaho soon found more effective methods of antagonizing LDS 
communities.   
Idaho Anti-Mormons struck a blow at Rexburg Mormons when they renamed the 
town “Kaintuck” from 1889-1893.  Harvey Walker “Kentucky” Smith assisted with anti-
Mormon judicial and political moves in the territory and, unsurprisingly, townspeople in 
Rexburg disliked him and referred to him derisively as “Kaintuck.”  Frederick Thomas 
Dubois had a longstanding feud with Idaho Mormons who had refused to vote for him.  
Dubois responded as a U. S. Marshall by hunting down polygamists for arrest.  His 
ultimate revenge came when, as a delegate for the Idaho territorial delegation to 
                                                 
 
14
 Crowder, 13-14. 
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 Official Declaration 1, The Doctrine and Covenants of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
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Washington, D.C., he used this opportunity to rename the Rexburg post office after 
“Kaintuck” Smith.  Rexburg officially became Kaintuck for four years.  Some outside of 
Idaho agreed, that “under territorial government the Mormons have been dealt with with 
a pretty high hand.”16 
One of the final official battles between Mormons and their non-Mormon 
neighbors came when Thomas Ricks secured the Fremont County seat (which 
encompassed present-day Fremont, Jefferson, Madison, and part of Butte counties).  
Ricks and the rest of Rexburg assumed that Rexburg would be the county seat as it was 
the second largest city in Idaho in 1893.  However, Governor William McConnell 
designated St. Anthony the temporary county seat until an 1894 election.  St. Anthony, 
Market Lake, and Rexburg all vied for the county seat at the ballot box.  Each city 
campaigned heavily to secure the seat of Fremont County, with Rexburg heavily favored 
to win.  Despite its superior number of voters, Rexburg lost to St. Anthony.  Many in 
Rexburg attributed Rexburg’s defeat to anti-Mormon sentiment.  However, Rexburg 
historian David Crowder argued, “that for St. Anthony to win meant that a substantial 
number of Mormon voters living outside Rexburg had voted for St. Anthony.”  Religious 
leaders in Rexburg encouraged the townspeople to let the loss go, end their complaining 
about anti-Mormon movements, and focus on the future prosperity of Rexburg.17  While 
Rexburg did move past the anti-Mormon attitudes, it maintained a wariness toward state 
and federal government interference long after the nineteenth century evidenced by their 
behavior in the summer of 1976. 
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The anti-Mormon movement in eastern Idaho mirrored a statewide trend that 
utilized judicial and legislative means to rile Mormons in Idaho in the late nineteenth 
century.  E. Leo Lyman argued that “controversy surrounding Mormonism may have 
been an even larger factor in Idaho politics than it was in Utah during their later territorial 
periods.”18  The opposition in Idaho more easily overpowered Mormons than anti-
Mormon movements in Utah for several reasons.  Communities in eastern Idaho tended 
to be mixtures of Mormon and non-Mormon populations in equal proportions, and the 
local governments were not theocratic like their Utah counterparts.19  The anti-Mormon 
movement in Idaho had several objections to the Mormon presence in their state (the 
largest Mormon population outside Utah).  Their initial objections came from a 
continuing stream of Mormons migrating northward from Utah, the tendency to form 
exclusive social and religious communities, their economic cooperatives from which they 
financially benefited, and the belief that they voted as a bloc for Democratic candidates 
and platforms.  Radical anti-Mormon Republicans in Idaho used the Mormon practice of 
polygamy as justification to disenfranchise Mormon voters (including many Mormons 
who did not participate in polygamy and those who had recently left the church) in the 
state, thereby lessening support for Idaho Democrats.20 
Those involved in the Idaho anti-Mormon movement believed that polygamy led 
church leaders into other illegal activities including evasion of law enforcement officers 
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or potentially plotting to overthrow the government.  They reasoned that members of the 
church did not vote freely because a “subversive, treasonous priesthood” dictated to 
them, and used this excuse to attempt to disenfranchise Mormons within the state.21  
Because they could not infringe on a U.S. citizen’s right to practice his religion, they 
formed a test oath act that did not actually mention the LDS Church by name, yet left 
little doubt about the identity of their intended target: 
any order, organization, or association which teaches, advises, counsels, or 
encourages its members or devotees, or any other persons, to commit the crime of 
bigamy or polygamy, or any other crime defined by law, either as a rite or a 
ceremony of such order…” was [not] to be permitted to vote, hold office, or serve 
on a jury.22 
 
The Test-Oath Act effectively prevented most participation by Mormons in government 
during the years it was in effect (1884-1892); however, it did not harm Mormon 
communities as much as its authors believed it would.  Mormon communities had already 
learned to survive independently of most government institutions.  They used their own 
church courts to enforce their teachings and formed their own schools to avoid battles 
over public school administration.23  
 Idaho entered the Union in 1890 with a warning to Mormons that an anti-Mormon 
territory had now become an anti-Mormon state.  Worried that Mormons would be able 
to vote again, radical Republicans worked to add a retroactive clause to the Test Oath Act 
stating that anyone who had belonged to a church that practiced polygamy on January 1, 
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1888, would be disenfranchised.  These Republicans drafted a state constitution that 
effectively made Idaho an anti-Mormon state if approved by Congress.  Under fire, the 
Mormon Church responded to these laws by making some concessions.  President 
Woodruff’s 1890 Manifesto ending the practice of polygamy quelled some fears about 
the future of polygamy in the LDS Church.24  He also answered critics wary of the 
church’s theocratic hierarchy by assuring them that the LDS Church was firmly 
committed to a separation of church and state.  Despite these concessions, Congress 
overwhelmingly approved Idaho’s anti-Mormon constitution.25  Eventually the anti-
Mormon movement weakened due to internal differences and the Mormons’ willingness 
to adapt their religious practices to meet Idaho law.  Idaho legislators repealed the Test-
Oath Act in 1894.26  Nevertheless, some anti-Mormon elements remained in the Idaho 
Constitution until 1982, demonstrating the enduring anti-Mormon sentiment in the state 
as late as the latter half of the twentieth-century.27 
 Anti-Mormon movements extended beyond state politics onto the national scene 
with the passage of the Edmunds and the Edmunds-Tucker Acts.  The Mormon Question: 
Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth Century America, by Sarah 
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Barringer Gordon, provides a comprehensive and fascinating look at this constitutional 
law crisis.  Gordon labeled the fight between the Mormon Church and the federal 
government a “conflict between sovereigns.”28  She argued that Mormons unjustly 
received no support or protection from the Missouri or Illinois state governments.  For 
Gordon, the federal government had the responsibility of addressing the expulsion of 
Mormons from Illinois and Missouri.  When the church settled in Utah, it was not yet a 
territory, making the issue of sovereignty ambiguous (at least in Mormon minds) in terms 
of control over local government.  The federal government chose polygamy for the 
battleground in the legal war against Mormon theocratic sovereignty.29  In 1882, the 
Edmunds Act became federal law, disenfranchising and barring any men practicing 
polygamy from juries or public office.  While it was decidedly a victory for anti-
polygamists and the federal government’s power, it still did not strike a major blow at the 
Mormon theocracy.30  
 The passage of the Edmunds-Tucker Act in 1887 hit the Mormon theocracy and 
practice of polygamy with more force than the 1882 effort.  The later act added more 
restrictions on marriage and the rights of those practicing polygamy, disenfranchised 
Utah women, and ended the church’s Perpetual Emigrating Fund Company.31  The U.S. 
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Supreme Court upheld an attempt to use the Edmunds-Tucker Act to dismantle the 
corporation of the Mormon Church in 1890, allowing for the confiscation of all of its 
property except for buildings utilized for worship.32  These extreme acts by Congress 
forced Mormons to make drastic changes to their religion in order to survive, such as 
abandoning polygamy.  Gordon concluded her book by questioning who won the battle 
for sovereignty.  She argued that the federal government soundly defeated the church in a 
constitutional battle.  Nevertheless, Gordon indicated that the church quickly recovered 
financially and lost very few of its members during this period, leading her to conclude 
that the government’s victory was “symbolic” at best.33 
 After the legal wrangling of the late nineteenth century ended, the church 
refocused its energies repairing the economic damage done to the church, assisting its 
members financially, and attempting to either assimilate into mainstream culture or avoid 
it.  Leonard Arrington argued in The Mormon Experience that after fifty years of conflict 
between the church and federal government, “Mormon institutions were undergoing 
profound changes, but the basic religious programs were as vigorous as they were during 
the administration of Brigham Young.”34  While the Mormon hierarchy moved away 
from having direct control and involvement in communities through managing irrigation, 
operating their own schools, and having their own political parties, they maintained what 
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Worster called, a “shadow theocracy.”35  Although the outside trappings of the Mormon 
theocracy fell away, as Arrington stated, the doctrines and religious programs endured.  
The Mormon hierarchy continued to influence its members heavily but in a less direct 
manner. 
 Matthew C. Godfrey, in his work Religion, Politics, and Sugar: The Mormon 
Church, the Federal Government, and the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, 1907-1921, 
provided an excellent look at the church’s transition from direct involvement in business 
into a convoluted “shadow theocracy” with a less-defined influence on Mormon-run 
enterprises.  When the Utah Sugar Company fell on hard times in the 1890s and could not 
repay its investors, President Wilford Woodruff circulated a letter to bishops and stake 
presidents in Utah encouraging them to support the company.  Woodruff believed that the 
Utah Sugar Company would prove an economic boon to church members by presenting 
affordable sugar to consumers and more jobs for the members of the church in Utah.  
Woodruff supported his sentiments by investing $180,000 into the enterprise and calling 
Heber J. Grant on a special church assignment to raise more funds to prop up the 
company.  In 1907, the Idaho Sugar Company and the Western Idaho Sugar Company 
joined the Utah Sugar Company, forming the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company with Prophet 
Joseph F. Smith as its president.36  
 In 1911, the House of Representatives evaluated the American Sugar Refining 
Company to see if it violated the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.  As part of this 
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investigation, they evaluated American Sugar’s relationship with Utah-Idaho Sugar.37   
Senator Hardwick of Georgia and his committee accused and established that the Sugar 
Trust (American Sugar and Utah-Idaho Sugar) had violated antitrust legislation, but never 
actually penalized them.  The real damage resulted from accusations regarding too much 
involvement by the Mormon hierarchy in the company, their willingness to manipulate 
their followers to turn a profit, and their followers’ inability or unwillingness to challenge 
their church leaders.38  Although the church had tried to move out of economic concerns 
in Mormon-dominated regions, the transition proved rocky at best, bringing more 
negative publicity and power struggles with the U.S. government in the early twentieth 
century.  
 After constantly facing-off against the government for over half a century, “the 
Mormons increasingly behaved as a normal religious denomination, rather than as a 
separate nationality or a millennial proto-state,” argued historian Nathan B. Oman.  
Oman asserted political restraint by the church marked the remainder of the twentieth 
century.  It carefully avoided political issues and only occasionally involved itself with 
moral issues that pertained to LDS doctrines such as Prohibition, gambling, and the Equal 
Rights Amendment.39  By the 1960s and 1970s their once radical adherence to traditional 
moral values became what historians Marvin S. Hill and James B. Allen termed strongly 
conservative; “Mormondom had become in its ideals a microcosm of what America was, 
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not what it was becoming.”40  Their accommodations to conservative American political 
and social norms were mostly on the surface, however, while their unique doctrines 
remained the same.41  The church hierarchy focused its efforts on generating positive 
publicity highlighting facets of their religion and community long overshadowed by the 
negativity of the previous one hundred years. 
 Eastern Idaho communities dominated by Mormons participated in the active 
separation of their church from government and cooperative business ventures.  Their 
reliance on their religion for political and cultural guidance remained intact from the 
nineteenth century as members moved into the latter-half of the twentieth century.  After 
struggling with government on a local and national level, most Mormons in eastern Idaho 
maintained a guarded attitude toward these institutions.  The Bureau of Reclamation and 
its water policies and projects in the West proved a glaring exception to their negative 
feelings toward government.  Irrigation and dam building had played a large role in the 
success of western Mormon settlements.  When the Bureau continued its work of 
“making the desert blossom” in the twentieth century, the LDS Church overwhelmingly 
supported its efforts.   
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CHAPTER 3: INSATIABLE WATER NEEDS, FAULTY GROUTING CURTAINS,  
 
AND THE SHORT LIFE OF THE TETON DAM 
  
 The relationship between Mormons in eastern Idaho and the Teton Dam began 
long before its collapse.  Manipulating rivers to irrigate the arid West had a history 
stretching back to the arrival of members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints under the direction of their prophet Brigham Young in the mid-nineteenth 
century.42  Marc Reisner, in his work Cadillac Desert: The American West and Its 
Disappearing Water, claimed that within hours of reaching the Salt Lake Valley the early 
Saints began constructing irrigation canals.  Reisner asserted, “Without realizing it, they 
were laying the foundation of the most ambitious desert civilization the world has seen.”  
Critical of both the LDS Church and western water management programs, Reisner went 
on to declare that the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, formed in 1902, was “based on 
Mormon experience, guided by Mormon laws, [and] run largely by Mormons.”43 
 Michael C. Robinson, in his work Water for the West: The Bureau of Reclamation 
1902-1977, lauded the early Mormon system of irrigation.  Robinson suggested that 
Mormon success with irrigation in Utah rested heavily on their luck in settling near 
several small streams and in their highly developed sense of community.  This sense of 
community placed the collective goal above the desires of individuals, “To Latter-day 
Saints, reclaiming the desert was part of ‘building up the Kingdom of God on Earth.’  
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Thus, community interest was placed above individual gain.”  Sympathetic to the Bureau 
of Reclamation’s mission of providing water for the arid states of the West, Robinson 
believed that Mormon pioneers in the Salt Lake Valley provided the groundwork for 
larger water projects that it would later develop beginning in 1902.44 
 From 1904, the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers 
evaluated various sites on or near the Teton River for the possible placement of a dam to 
store water, produce power, and prevent flooding.  One of the first proposed sites they 
assessed in 1932 lay fifteen miles from the future dam site in the Teton River Canyon.  
They rejected this site because it would not maximize irrigation and flood control in the 
area due to its inability to completely manage the river drain off.  The Bureau of 
Reclamation returned to the project in 1946 looking at two sites on Canyon Creek, but 
found these also could not grant enough control of the Teton River.  The Bureau 
proposed a smaller dam at the mouth of the canyon in 1956.  The Bureau claimed this 
particular site could only control flooding in the area but would fail to provide any 
irrigational benefits.45  Without the possibility of improving irrigation, many residents of 
the Upper Snake River Valley concurred this project lacked merit. 
 Agriculture dominated Mormon communities in eastern Idaho, and with this 
pursuit followed a need for more irrigation developments in the northern reaches of 
Mormon country.  The nature of the soil in the Snake River Plain perfectly suited Idaho’s 
signature agricultural product, the potato, with its loose and somewhat sandy soil.  
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Unfortunately, this type of soil drains quickly, requiring copious amounts of water to 
make it profitable for farming.  The Snake River brings in a considerable amount of water 
from the spring runoff on the Yellowstone Plateau and Grand Teton Mountains, but the 
water continues down the Snake before farmers can fully utilize it.  A drought in 1961 
and a flood in 1962 hit eastern Idaho hard, causing several hundred thousand dollars in 
damage and led to another serious look at constructing a dam in the Teton River 
Canyon.46 
 A committee formed between the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of 
Reclamation in 1956 to evaluate the Upper Snake River Basin, which included some 
initial investigatory work on the Teton Project.  In 1961 and 1962, the Bureau took 
several core samples at the site where they eventually constructed the Teton Dam.  The 
Bureau also evaluated the geological feasibility of the original dam site and a site further 
up the canyon.  Deeming both locations geologically sound for a possible dam, the 
Bureau favored the original site because it promised greater irrigation and flood control 
benefits.  Several reports compiled by geologists remarked that seepage from the 
reservoir in large quantities could occur.  In March 1962, the Corps of Engineers 
recommended the proposed Teton Project with a dam at the original site.47  
 Reisner argued that while the region debated the possibility of a dam over more 
than half a century, it received authorization and began construction in a “great hurry.”48  
He attributed this sudden desire to move forward with the project to one local man, “a 
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crotchety Mormon farmer” named Willis Walker.  Walker served as the president of the 
Fremont-Madison Irrigation District and united farmers in this district behind the cause of 
a potential Teton Dam.49  Reisner acerbically pointed out the irony of a Mormon farmer 
calling for federal spending on a dam and irrigation project.  He quoted critic of the dam 
Russell Brown, a senior research engineer for Allied Chemical Corporation, “Mormons 
get burned up when they read about someone buying a bottle of mouthwash with food 
stamps, but they love big water projects.  They only object to nickel-and-dime welfare.  
They love it in great big gobs.”50 
 On September 7, 1964, a public law authorized the construction of the Teton Dam 
at its present site.51  The Office of Design and Construction of the Bureau designed the 
dam out of its Denver Federal Center.52  After Harold Arthur, the Director of Design and 
Construction, completed the design in early 1971, the Bureau called for construction bids 
that included all facets of the dam project except the mechanical and electrical aspects.  
On December 13, 1971, the Bureau awarded Morrison-Knudsen-Kiewit the contract for 
39.5 million dollars and told them to proceed the following day.53  Excavators began 
working on the dam site in February 1972.  Workers broke ground before the opposition 
had time to organize a public forum addressing the potential merits or problems posed by 
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the Teton Dam.54 
On June 2, 1972, a conference regarding the construction of the Teton Dam 
convened in Idaho Falls, with the opposition to the dam heavily represented.  Many 
concerned about the environment, the safety of the site, and the necessity of the project 
voiced their disagreement with the position that the dam project had value.  Robert 
Sherwood and Paul Jeppson from the Idaho Fish and Game Department deplored the 
effects of the dam on the fish population, which would suffer due to higher river water 
temperatures.  The deer in the region would also lose thousands of grazing acres along 
the river.  Many skeptical of the dam questioned the actual economic value and benefit.55  
A report by the Bureau admitted that the dam would only provide a couple more inches 
of water to farmers who already received a fair amount of water without the dam.  The 
Teton Dam promised local farmers 132 inches of water per year; an extreme figure by 
western standards and on par with the annual rainfall of tropical forests.56 
 The most alarming arguments against the dam focused on potential safety issues, 
when combined with the negative environmental impact and perceived lack of economic 
benefit made the dam look like more trouble than it was worth.  Russell Brown pointed 
out a major issue at the Idaho Falls meeting: the proposed dam site resided in the center 
of a major risk earthquake zone.57  Reisner recalled an internal 1972 Bureau 
memorandum penned by geologist Dave Schleicher where he recounted several serious 
flaws with the dam site of which he believed the Bureau remained ignorant.  He pointed 
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out that within thirty miles of the dam five earthquakes had occurred in the last five 
years.  Schleicher expressed concern that he could not find any evidence in project 
documents where the Bureau acknowledged those risks.  His memorandum concluded:  
 A final point is that flooding in response to seismic or other failure of the dam—
 probably most likely at the time of highest water—would make the flood of 
 February 1962 look like small potatoes.  Since such a flood could be anticipated, 
 we might consider a series of strategically-placed motion-picture cameras to 
 document the process… 
 
Someone within the Bureau edited the memorandum to remove Schleicher’s alarmist 
tone before passing it on to Robbie Robison, the Bureau’s on-site Chief engineer.58 
 Aside from seismic risks, geological studies revealed that the canyon walls and 
floor presented an exceptional challenge for dam engineers.  Drilling tests conducted over 
a period of several years before the construction of the dam demonstrated that fissures 
riddled the walls of the canyon, increasing the likelihood of leaks from the reservoir.  The 
Bureau performed grouting tests that involved pumping cement into crevices on the south 
abutment of the dam to ascertain whether the Bureau’s plan would effectively address the 
highly porous canyon walls.  The Bureau did not perform grouting tests on the north 
abutment of the dam where they would later discover enormous fissures.59   
The Bureau’s handling of the porous nature of the canyon wall calls into question 
its full understanding of the terrain they chose and its willingness to admit that it had 
never faced a site like this on any of its previous projects.  The Bureau’s engineers had a 
near perfect dam building record from the beginning of the twentieth century (the 
Fontenelle Dam in Wyoming threatened to collapse in 1965, but the Bureau salvaged the 
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situation with quick repairs, preventing a disaster).  Robbie Robison, in a memo to his 
superiors, called attention to “unusually large” fissures found in the right abutment of the 
dam, one eleven feet wide and another one hundred feet long.  The Bureau initially 
missed these “unusually large” crevices in its preliminary assessment and actually 
decided against grouting them in the interest of maintaining its construction schedule.60  
Clifford Okeson, a Bureau geologist who examined the dam site, recalled that the Teton 
Dam required more grouting than any previous Bureau dam.  He also remembered that 
the Bureau decided against filling an eleven-foot fissure discovered in November 1974 
because it would have delayed the project.61 
 The earth filled embankment of the Teton Dam reached 305 feet (5,322 feet above 
sea level) with the crest at 3,100 feet across when dam construction ended in November 
1975.  The Bureau began to fill the reservoir a month earlier and it achieved a depth of 
185 feet in May of 1976.62  The snowpack during the winter of 1975-76 reached levels 
well above one hundred percent and in some areas over two hundred percent of the 
average snow water equivalents.  The Bureau had cautiously implemented rules about the 
rate of filling a reservoir, especially for a newly constructed dam, that resided over five 
thousand feet above sea level.63  To detect any type of problems with any portion of the 
dam or reservoir, the Bureau kept the rate of fill at or below one foot a day for the 
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reservoir with daily inspections at and below the dam for leaks.64   
Robbie Robison wrote in March 1976 to Harold Arthur in Denver requesting 
permission to accelerate the rate to two feet per day in an effort to speed up the filling of  
the reservoir and truly test the effectiveness of the Bureau’s elaborate grout curtain.  
Arthur consented to the two feet per day limit for May of that year.65  Reisner compared 
this justification to “arguing for a hundred-mile-per-hour speed limit on the grounds that 
motorists would spend less time on dangerous highways if they drove twice as fast.”66  
The greater than normal spring runoff on the Teton River actually increased the rate of 
fill to three or four feet per day several times in April and May.  With the reservoir rising 
rapidly, Robison sent a faxogram to Denver stating that the river outlet works and the 
spillway gates were not yet functional and asking for advice on this matter.  In the mail at 
the time of the flood, a message from Denver dated June 4, 1976, reassured Robison that 
“the river outlet works need not be used prior to completion […] unless problems directly 
related to filling of the reservoir develop in the foundation, embankment or structures.”  
The letter did recommend that construction crews should complete these projects as soon 
as possible.67  Without construction completed on the spillway and the river works outlet 
(the construction schedule had the main structure of the dam completed in March, but 
several other projects remained unfinished at the time of collapse in June), the Bureau 
possessed no means to control the rate of fill on the reservoir.68  The sunny and warm 
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days in early June quickly melted the snowpack and inundated a Teton Reservoir that had 
no functional safety valve to release the increasing pressure on the dam. 
 Before June 3, inspections of the dam and riverbed below the dam showed no 
signs of abnormal leaks or seepage.  On June 3, inspectors observed two small leaks 
1,300 and 1,500 feet downstream from the right abutment of the dam.69  Inspectors 
carefully completed visual checks on June 4, paying close attention to the north side of 
the canyon downstream of the right toe of the dam and the right abutment.70  Inspectors 
found no new leaks until 7:00 a.m. on June 5, when an inspector spotted leakage 5,200 
feet up the right abutment.  The inspector informed Robison, who quickly made his way 
to the dam.  Three more leaks sprang up on the actual dam between 8:30 and 9:30 a.m. 
that Saturday morning, some on the seam of the dam and the right abutment.  At this 
point Robison considered alerting officials in Madison and Fremont counties situated 
directly below the dam, but, after talking to his superiors in Washington, Denver, and 
Boise, he decided that the situation did not yet present an emergency.71 
 At 10:15 a.m., a wet spot developed forty feet up the face of the dam near the 
right abutment and began to leak and erode the embankment.  Those near the dam heard a 
loud roar and the sound of rushing water at 10:30 a.m. with the volume of water leaking 
visibly increasing.  Robison visually inspected the eroding area on the right abutment and 
saw a tunnel thirty to forty feet in length and six feet in diameter on the face of the dam.  
He sent two bulldozers to the scene in an attempt to fill the rapidly expanding holes in the 
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dam.  Next, he decided to notify the sheriffs of Madison and Fremont counties of 
potential flooding and a possible need for an evacuation.  The bulldozers worked for 
nearly thirty minutes when they lost traction on the embankment and the drivers leaped to 
safety as their machines floated off downstream at 11:30 a.m.72 
 While the bulldozer operators frantically tried to fill the burgeoning hole on the 
face of the dam, a whirlpool developed in the reservoir, fifteen to twenty feet from the 
dam.  Bulldozers on the upstream side of the dam tried to push rock material into the 
whirlpool without success and Robison removed them at 11:45 a.m., when a sinkhole 
developed on the downstream face of the dam.73  At this point, the Bureau could do 
nothing but observe the dam it built dissolve into the roiling water.  At 11:55 a.m., the 
crest of the dam collapsed and two minutes later the embankment crumbled, spilling the 
contents of the reservoir down the canyon in enormous, brown waves.74  In less than two 
hours, the situation at the Teton Dam went from a lesser concern to a full-blown disaster 
on a path to destroy everything in the valley. 
 Robison had notified the sheriffs in Madison and Fremont counties around 11:00 
a.m. to evacuate all low-lying areas below the dam, but he had only said “there was a 
possibility the dam would go but it would ‘go slowly.’”75  This description of the 
impending demise of the dam conveyed little sense of urgency and no scope of the 
potential disaster to the sheriffs, who consequently took no immediate action to warn the 
people.  Others, such as police officials and radio announcers, who witnessed the demise 
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of the dam understood the situation better than Robison and tried to vociferously warn 
people living below the dam. 
 Warnings about the collapse of the dam came from radio and television 
broadcasts, phone calls from friends and relatives, and visits from concerned neighbors.  
Eight miles downstream, the little town of Wilford took the first direct hit from a twenty-
foot wall of water spilling out of the canyon.  Between 12:20 and 12:30 p.m. the water 
rushed through Wilford, effectively wiping it off the map.  The water ripped 120 of the 
154 homes in the town from their foundations and washed them further downstream.76  
Martha Black, a resident of Wilford, had just sat down to lunch when a neighbor pounded 
on her door and yelled at her “Get out!  Get out!  Get out!  The Teton Dam has burst!  
The flood is coming!”  She and her husband grabbed armfuls of clothes and some 
keepsakes and drove to safety in St. Anthony.77 
 Most residents of Wilford escaped town before the flood roared in; however, Glen 
Bedford was not as lucky.  Bedford met his in-laws, the Liedings, at his sister-in-law’s 
home in St. Anthony and saw Mrs. Lieding in the front yard, but not his father-in-law 
(who was around the back of the house).  Bedford raced back to Wilford to look for his 
father-in-law and grab remaining mementos at the Lieding home.  Mr. Lieding chased 
after him, arriving in Wilford in time to see what appeared to be a fifty-foot wall of water 
emerging from the canyon only a mile and a half away.  He called to Bedford, who told 
him he would be right behind him on his way to St. Anthony.  Beyond recognition among 
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the debris, volunteers did not find Bedford’s body until eleven days after the flood.78  The 
Teton Dam failure took eleven lives over the course of the disaster; including six 
drowning deaths in Fremont County.79 
 Residents of Sugar City lived twelve miles southwest of the dam.  Sugar City 
resident Donna Webster first heard about the collapse from radio broadcaster Don Ellis, 
on Rexburg's KRXX at a quarter to noon.  Both Donna and her husband expressed little 
concern over the dam breaking because they had experienced flooding before.  
Nevertheless, Ellis persisted in yelling warnings from the dam site and imploring people 
to gather their families and head for higher ground.  Donna attributed her survival to 
Ellis’s broadcast.  She heeded his warning, and in her confusion, all she could think to 
bring from home was bowl of bread dough: so she grabbed it and left.80  At 1:30 that 
afternoon a fifteen-foot wave of water engulfed Sugar City damaging almost every home 
in town.81 
 Keith Walker, a resident of Rexburg and the chairman of the Madison County 
Commissioners, viewed the flood from a plane.  In the air, Walker “kept hoping that as 
big as the valley was, even with that much pressure coming, that the water would spread 
out and lose its force.”  Walker approached the crest of the flood just as it spilled over the 
roof of the Wilford LDS church building, at which point he realized this flood had the 
potential to be worse than any the valley had ever seen.  He radioed back to another 
county commissioner and described the situation to him.  An aerial perspective truly 
                                                 
 
78
 Reisner, 404. 
 
79
 Graham, 8, 10. 
 
80
 Thomas et al., 29-30. 
 
81
 Graham, 8. 
  
36 
captured the horror of horses and cows vainly trying to out run or swim the wall of water, 
the spectacle of floating homes and cars, and the ugliness of the wave “that didn’t really 
look like water, it had so much dirt and dust in it.  It looked like a big cloud of dust, like a 
terrific wind storm.”82 
The largest city in Madison County, Rexburg, lay fifteen miles from the dam.83  
While the rest of the town occupies the valley on the edge of the foothills, Ricks College 
rested on higher ground overlooking the town.  Rexburg had over two hours from the 
initial warning until the floodwaters rolled through town, so police and neighbors 
effectively evacuated the area.  Most residents sought refuge at Ricks on College Hill 
where they had a close, unobstructed view of the floodwaters washing away their 
homes.84  Warren R. Widdison heard about the failure of the dam from several neighbors 
just before noon.  He thought that they must be misinformed, but decided to verify their 
story at the fire department.  While there, Widdison heard the call come in to evacuate 
Rexburg.  He and his wife moved the contents of their basement to the top floor of their 
home and loaded their car with emergency supplies.  Widdison worked at a bank in town 
and wanted to drive by to make sure employees had turned off the power and vacated the 
building.  Driving by the bank a man yelled at the Widdisons to leave because just a few 
blocks away the flood started its rampage through downtown Rexburg.  Reaching a safe 
vantage point, Widdison and his wife watched as at least six feet of water washed through 
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Main Street, with rolling barrels, logs, and other debris.85 
 Idaho Falls, sixty-three miles from the dam, had thirteen hours to prepare for the 
arrival of the floodwaters.  Late Saturday and early Sunday sandbagging crews worked 
rapidly to build up the banks of the Snake River in an effort to control flooding as it went 
through town.  The sandbagging effort effectively prevented the flooding of most homes 
and businesses near the river.  The biggest concern in Idaho Falls became the Broadway 
Bridge.  Debris slammed into the bridge and increased flooding in the vicinity.  Crews 
tried unsuccessfully to blow up the bridge with dynamite.  When this did not work, city 
officials decided to dig emergency channels to divert the floodwaters around the bridge, 
which secured its survival during the night.86  The flood continued through Idaho Falls, 
Shelley, and Blackfoot until it reached the American Falls Reservoir, thirty-six hours 
later and 150 miles from the dam, where the reservoir easily accommodated the extra 
water.87 
 Wayne J. Graham, in his 2008 presentation at the Association of the State Dam 
Safety Officials, declared of the Teton Dam collapse, whether “measured in terms of 
either dam height or volume of water released, the failure was the worst in U.S. 
history.”88  Marc Reisner claimed that the resulting flood was “the second-largest flood in 
North America since the last Ice Age.”89  The flood in Rexburg peaked at 6:30 p.m. when 
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the waters began to recede, leaving an unimaginable path of destruction and damage that 
made the sunny morning of June 5th seem like a lifetime ago.  Dorothy Hegsted of 
Rexburg vividly recalled what the Teton left behind when the waters withdrew, “leaving 
in its wake hundreds of bawling cattle and dead livestock in the streets, stores gutted, 
houses off their foundations, some moved blocks away, cars leaning against houses, 
debris and logs piled up.”90 
 Gary Olsen, the director of the Manwaring Center at Ricks College at the time of 
the flood, called the radio station after he heard about the failure of the dam and told them 
to announce that “rather than have people just get out of their homes, to come up here to 
the campus and check in at the Manwaring Center.”91  Olsen and his staff pulled out large 
sheets of paper and started writing down the names of the flood victims who poured into 
the facility.  Eventually they gathered all of the available typewriters and began typing 
the lists.  While the water rolled into Rexburg, Olsen started marshalling his resources.  
He assigned volunteers to set-up chairs for people to sit on, communicated with food 
services requesting them to have a meal ready for service at 5:00 p.m., and began 
organizing clothing donations that had already started to come in for flood victims.92  The 
LDS Church subsidizes and oversees the operation of Ricks College, now BYU-I.  Olsen 
and his coworkers’ actions demonstrated this impetus experienced by members of the 
LDS Church to quickly assume leadership roles as the disaster unfolded. 
 When the flood proved more devastating to the areas below the college than 
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anyone could have expected, Olsen started assigning people dorm rooms for the night.  
Those who did not stay in the dorms found temporary shelter with other families in the 
area whose homes escaped the water or with relatives not far from the floodplain.  Some 
people took in as many as seven other families.  Nearly seventeen hundred people spent 
Saturday night in the dorms or in someone else’s home.93 
 Pat Price, the director of foodservices at Ricks, immediately went into action 
filling pots with water in the event that Ricks lost its water supply.  He and his crew then 
started making soup for dinner that night.  Price and his wife stayed up all night preparing 
soup for the victims and arranging breakfast for the following morning.94  While Price 
and his wife worked around the clock to ensure enough food for everyone who showed 
up to the Manwaring Center, they missed their only opportunity to salvage any personal 
belongings or ascertain the flood damage to their own home.95  Price and his wife, both 
members of the LDS Church, prioritized the welfare of others above their own needs, 
harkening back to the communal aspects characteristic of Mormonism from its earliest 
days. 
 Just hours into the disaster, unique problems began to emerge among the flood 
victims at the Manwaring Center.  Many families with babies and young children sought 
shelter at Ricks and did not bring enough diapers or baby formula to even make it 
through the night.  Ricks College contacted Max Call, a member of an Idaho Falls stake 
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presidency and informed him that they needed diapers and formula quickly.  Call and 
several members of his ward bought all the baby supplies they could find in Idaho Falls, 
loaded them in a truck and delivered them by Saturday night.  Some babies required 
goat’s milk and a quart showed-up anonymously Saturday night along with two goats that 
they continued to milk in the days to come.96 
 After trying to warn anyone he could reach, Ferron Sonderegger, a Rexburg-area 
stake president and professor and football coach at Ricks, made his way to the college 
and tried to locate other area Stake Presidents Keith Peterson and Mark Ricks.  He then 
quickly worked to activate the priesthood leadership of the church following the line of 
authority characteristic of the Mormon Church in any circumstance.  When he could not 
find them, President Sonderegger went to his office at Ricks and tried calling the LDS 
Presiding Bishop Victor Brown at church headquarters in Salt Lake City, Utah.97  
Because it was Saturday Bishop Brown was not in, but Sonderegger made contact with 
someone in the office and told him of the dire situation developing in eastern Idaho.  
Finally, Quinn Gardner made contact with Sonderegger; he had previously worked on 
church welfare efforts during a Guatemalan disaster.  Gardner asked Sonderegger to 
report to him every hour in order to stay apprised of the evolving situation.  Gardner also 
asked what Sonderegger thought the flood victims needed immediately.  They agreed that 
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blankets and food would address any urgent concerns in the Rexburg area.98 
 Saturday night, several hours after President Sonderegger’s first call, a truck from 
the LDS Church Welfare System made it into Rexburg and unloaded its contents at the 
Manwaring Center.  Those who took advantage of the dorm rooms at Ricks that night 
enjoyed clean bedding to cover the bare mattresses in their rooms. The welfare system 
also provided coats and other clothes to those who only possessed what they were 
wearing when they escaped the flood.  The first truck did not contain enough supplies for 
everyone in need that night, but truck after truck followed in a constant stream to bring 
much needed supplies to the displaced population in the disaster area.99 
 Most people went to sleep Saturday night in dry clothes, fed, and in some type of 
shelter.  Friends and neighbors, the Red Cross, local church leadership, or the central 
church welfare system had met their immediate needs.  Nevertheless, Nola Vance of 
Sugar City, who wrote a memoir of her flood experiences entitled Safe in a Hayfield: 
Overcoming the Challenges of the Teton Dam Disaster, remembered the despair she 
experienced as she reflected on the sacrifice and work she and her husband had invested 
to make their farm productive.  That evening she wondered, “What did our property look 
like now?  […]  How will this tragedy impact my life?”100  Not alone with her anger, 
despair, and disbelief, Vance echoed what many of the flood victims struggled within the 
darkness of that Saturday night and faced at the dawn of Sunday morning. 
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 For Vance and others, the announcement of a conference with Stake Presidents 
Sonderegger, Ricks, and Peterson in the Hart Auditorium at Ricks brought hope.  The 
gathered assembly sang the LDS hymn “Come, Come Ye Saints,” written by William 
Clayton to commemorate the sufferings and achievements of the early Mormon pioneers 
who left their settlement in Nauvoo to escape persecution and find a peaceful home in the 
West.  Vance took comfort in phrases found in the second verse: 
 Why should we think to earn a great reward, 
  If we now shun the fight? 
 Gird up your loins, fresh courage take, 
  Our God will never us forsake; 
 And soon we’ll have this tale to tell— 
  All is well!  All is well!101 
 
The speakers at the conference urged their listeners to work, rebuild, and record their 
spiritual, humorous, and miraculous experiences in the coming weeks and months.  
Speakers also encouraged the assembly to start cleaning up their homes and communities 
and not wait for government assistance.  President Sonderegger had contacted the LDS 
Church headquarters and it knew of the circumstances of the people in the Upper Snake 
River Valley.  Vance reported that the morale of the audience received a boost when they 
knew the church had assured its help.102  Members of the Mormon Church believed 
strongly that their doctrines of self-reliance and independence would successfully guide 
them through this tragedy.  They willingly put their faith in the church rather than the 
federal government. 
 Before the dam even broke the local organizational system of the LDS church 
went into action to address the emerging disaster situation.  This Mormon community 
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activated several levels of church leadership to meet the needs of the flood victims.  Max 
Call, a local priesthood leader, organized other priesthood holders to bring needed 
supplies into Rexburg.  Stake presidents and bishops in the area telephoned warnings to 
those in their stakes and wards, and after the waters receded checked to make sure 
everyone in their jurisdiction (members or not) had a place to stay Saturday night.  
President Sonderegger initiated communication with the main welfare system of the 
church, which had previous experience in aiding disaster victims, and brought supplies 
only hours after the breach of the dam.  The LDS-owned and affiliated Ricks College put 
its entire campus at the disposal of flood victims and later the private and governmental 
agencies that would come to help in the ensuing recovery period. 
 The victims of the Teton Dam disaster had no idea what the future held for them.  
Many did not even know if their houses had survived that Saturday night.  Yet, all of the 
available resources of their local church and its leadership reassured the Mormons of 
eastern Idaho that night.  The attitude of wariness toward the federal government and 
outside agencies espoused by the church for over a century continued to influence 
members in the summer of 1976.  Mormons in eastern Idaho placed unwavering faith and 
trust in the full support of LDS Church headquarters to assist them on their road to 
physical and spiritual recovery.   
 Having the full support of the church during the recovery process not only 
provided victims of the flood with a sense of security, but they also sensed an opportunity 
to demonstrate to their non-member neighbors, outside agencies, and the nation the value 
of their welfare system and priesthood organization.  President Sonderegger reminded 
Bruce Blumell in an interview shortly following the disaster “we should never overlook 
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the non-members who have been in here.  This has been a great fellowshipping 
opportunity.”103  Church leaders perceived that the disaster provided an invaluable 
opportunity to put Mormonism in a positive light.  The Sunday meeting also showed to 
members that the church would direct the terms of the recovery process.  They would 
make no changes to how the hierarchy of the priesthood functioned and would play the 
traditional role of the federal government by being the primary agency in organizing all 
facets of post-disaster restoration.  This approach added a new chapter to the typical 
American disaster response and a perceived shift in the history of Mormonism in 
America. 
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CHAPTER 4: MORMONISM IN TRANSITION   
  
 Despite the amount of property damaged and the vast portion of land affected by 
the collapse of the Teton Dam, this disaster has received very little treatment beyond 
minor analysis in larger works about the Bureau of Reclamation, western water 
management, or general accounts of Mormon history.  The minimal loss of life may lead 
many historians to misjudge the magnitude of this disaster and prevent further 
investigation.  In David L. Crowder’s work, Rexburg, Idaho: The First One Hundred 
Years, 1883-1983, the 1976 dam failure received only slight mention with the author 
giving a passing account of the dam failure and recovery effort.104  Other works, such as 
Dylan J. McDonald’s The Teton Dam Disaster, provide an excellent description of the 
events of June 5, but do not offer any type of historical analysis.  The Ricks College Press 
produced That Day in June: Reflections on the Teton Dam Disaster, a compilation of 
experiences by those in the affected area from the oral history interviews conducted by 
historians from Ricks College, Utah State University, and the LDS Church.  That Day in 
June relies on the impressions of victims without providing much analysis. 
 Historical examination of the Teton Dam failure may be limited, but the oral 
history interviews held in BYU Idaho’s Special Collections provide myriad perspectives 
on the causes of the failure, of attempts to flee the rampaging waters, about the early days 
of the recovery, and on the long-term issues that survivors faced following the disaster.  
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Local residents provided most of the oral histories and many of these residents claimed 
membership in the church.  Bruce D. Blumell, the official LDS Church Historian in 1976, 
also conducted a series of interviews for the church, mostly of priesthood leaders at 
various levels (i.e. stake presidencies or bishoprics).  In addition to church leaders, he 
included the representatives of several government agencies sent to the Rexburg area.  
The analysis here relies largely on these oral history interviews to describe the unique 
Mormon perspective of this event and on the perception of those outside the church and 
their response to a largely Mormon community. 
 Marc Reisner, Donald Worster, Wayne J. Graham, and Michael C. Robinson offer 
insightful analyses about the significance of the Teton Dam disaster and what it meant to 
the history of the Bureau of Reclamation in their respective works.  Robinson and 
Graham’s examinations of the disaster are more sensitive toward the Bureau.  Robinson’s 
argument in Water for the West: The Bureau of Reclamation, 1902-1977, asserted that the 
responsibility of the dam failure rested with the Bureau, but this event led to 
improvements in oversight on their future projects.  Robinson referred to the era 
following Teton as “reclamation in transition,” admitting that the credibility of the 
Bureau had suffered.  The Bureau had learned from Teton, Robinson asserted, and the 
vast changes the Bureau had implemented in the western United States improved the land 
making it more habitable through irrigation projects.105 
 Wayne J. Graham echoed Robinson’s cautiously upbeat tone in his paper “The 
Teton Dam Failure-An Effective Warning and Evacuation,” presented at the Association 
of State Dam Safety Officials 2008 conference.  Graham supported findings that held the 
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Bureau’s design of the dam at fault for its failure.  Nevertheless, he chose to focus his 
analysis on the timely recognition by the Bureau that their dam was in imminent danger 
of collapsing, which allowed for an effective evacuation and minimized the loss of life.  
Even when admitting that the Bureau violated its own policy for filling the dam, Graham 
still praised the team on site for frequently monitoring the area for any sign that the 
rapidly filling reservoir could jeopardize the structural integrity of the dam.106 
 Marc Reisner provided one of the most compelling and scathing accounts of the 
failure of the Teton Dam in Cadillac Desert.  For Reisner, Teton signaled the end to a 
heyday of Bureau dam building.  His research revealed that dam sites had become more 
questionable, but with the Bureau’s impeccable reputation, not many people involved in 
these projects questioned their decision-making.107  Reisner condemned the Bureau for 
the silence it maintained after the failure of Teton, remarking that no Bureau employees 
lost their jobs in the wake of four different investigations into the collapse of the dam.  
Idaho politicians, Mormons, and western water users also faced Reisner’s acerbic 
assessment of their desire to rebuild the Teton Dam at its original site.  The Bureau and 
its supporters, according to Reisner, had no understanding about the environmental limits 
of the area or ability of technology to overcome these limits.108 
 Donald Worster, in his work Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and the Growth of 
the American West, devoted less analysis on the meaning of the Teton Dam failure than 
Reisner, but essentially agreed with Reisner’s denunciation of water-hungry westerners.  
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“A tragedy like Teton Dam could give no one satisfaction, but it could usefully suggest 
that the hydraulic society had a misplaced, dangerous confidence in its mastery, through 
concrete, steel, and earth, over nature.”109  Worster viewed Teton as a warning, convinced 
that the hubris of the Bureau, other dam building agencies, and western states would 
easily permit another tragedy to happen in their pursuit of greater control over natural 
resources.  
 Several historians studying this disaster have looked at the unique religious 
perspective on the dam failure through the lens of Mormon doctrines.  Not many of the 
LDS residents in the area experienced any sort of premonition or foreboding that the dam 
would collapse, but numerous members of the church believed that miracles and spiritual 
lessons followed the receding floodwaters.  Kent Marlor, the Operations Director of Civil 
Defense and church member, believed that the flood taught victims humility and fostered 
a desire among church members to better prepare themselves for future disasters and 
difficult situations.110  Most members of the church believed that the timing of the 
disaster showed divine intervention.  President of the LDS Church at the time of the 
disaster, Spencer W. Kimball, maintained that the flood occurring in the middle of the 
day showed divine mercy and gratefully declared, “thanks has been to our Heavenly 
Father that we have come out of it in large measure without the loss of lives.”111  Most 
Mormons supported the idea that the dam failed due to human error rather than divine 
punishment.  Dale Nicholls, interviewed following the flood, believed that they were “not 
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being punished for anything, that is not why the dam collapsed.”  He believed that if “we 
lived right and do the things that we are supposed to, as far as the church goes, it would 
be a blessing to us.”112  For LDS members residing in the Upper Snake River Valley, this 
disaster signaled an opportunity to make positive changes in their lives.  Other church 
members supposed God allowed for this disaster to serve as a warning to vigilantly 
prepare both spiritually and temporally for future trials of faith similar to the Teton Dam 
disaster.   
 Brent Kinghorn, an administrator at Ricks, outlined several lessons he learned 
from the recovery effort, shared by many other Mormons in the area, such as a need for 
increased humility, greater attention to family, the importance of supporting the 
community, and a reaffirmation of the goodness of humanity.113  The oral histories of this 
disaster reveal these central themes as the narratives that dominated LDS residents’ 
understanding of this catastrophic event.  Mormon leaders and members wanted this 
tragedy to be a triumph in order to encourage a positive perception of the church by its 
own members and those not of their faith. 
 While many historians have used Teton to criticize the Bureau or western water 
usage, scholars of Mormon history have used this disaster for starkly different purposes.  
In addition to the influence of Mormon theology on perceptions of the disaster, Mormon 
historians Leonard J. Arrington, Davis Bitton, F. Ross Peterson, and Bruce D. Blumell 
have analyzed the evacuation, emergency, and recovery phases of this disaster to reveal 
the role the LDS Church played during and following the disaster.  These historians 
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declared it a story of success for the Mormon Church.  All four generally agreed that 
despite the extensive damage to property and the local landscape, the Teton Dam failure 
provided an opportunity for the LDS Church to promote a positive image of its welfare 
system and leadership organization to members and those organizations and leaders 
outside the church. 
 Arrington and Bitton supported this positive view of easy cooperation between 
the Mormon Church members and the government.  The Mormon Experience portrays the 
charity and self-sufficiency of the Mormons with regard to making the work of the 
federal agencies more efficient and effective following the disaster.114  F. Ross Peterson 
defended this perspective in his address presented at the 1982 Utah State University 
Annual Faculty Honor Lecture entitled “The Teton Dam Disaster: Tragedy or Triumph?”  
Peterson acknowledged the tragedy of those who died in the flood and the catastrophic 
level of damage to property and the environment, but also concluded that the dam failure 
resulted in a triumph of “volunteerism, government, and religion [in which] a sense of 
community was maintained.”115  Peterson’s conclusions differ vastly from those of 
Reisner or Worster, who saw the dam failure as a blight on human history.  Peterson 
blatantly disagreed with this position and finished his lecture claiming, “The Teton Dam 
story […] will contribute to the glory of our past.” 
 Using the thirty-eight interviews he conducted in 1976, Blumell analyzed how a 
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largely LDS community responded to a disaster of this magnitude.116  He concluded that 
the Mormon community lengthened the amount of time that people typically behaved 
altruistically following a disaster due to their emphasis on the welfare of the community 
over the individual.  He also echoed the prevailing opinion among church members that 
Teton provided an opportunity for the church to test its welfare system.  Blumell found 
several areas where the church could improve its disaster response approach, from 
acquiring a helicopter to including the Relief Society (a women’s organization within the 
church) more in exclusively addressing the needs of disaster victims.117  Blumell found 
some obvious shortcomings in the LDS response, but gave measured praise to the church 
for its successful handling of the Teton Dam disaster. 
 Previous historians who have addressed this disaster have affirmed the desire of 
the church to prove to members and nonmembers that it could effectively work with 
outside agencies and comprehensively support its own membership.  Elder Melvin J. 
Ballard of the First Presidency in 1949 explained that one of the roles of the church’s 
welfare system was to gain a positive outside response.  Speaking of another disaster, 
Ballard claimed, “The Church rose magnificently to the great emergency and put into 
operation a welfare program which at once attracted the attention and favorable comment 
of the entire nation.  Nothing else has ever brought to this Church so much favorable 
publicity as has this program.”118  The church has used the positive aspects of this 
disaster response in a narrative of cooperation, self-reliance, and a new level of 
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accommodation not known in the nineteenth century church.  This narrative, while 
somewhat accurate, glosses over the reality of Arrington’s hypothesis relating to this 
disaster, that the changes were only superficial.  The church did work with government 
agencies, but many times dictated the terms, used the priesthood to carry out secular 
tasks, and mediated most of the interactions between local members and government 
programs.  The church intended to change nothing, save its image, and protect itself and 
members from government and outside influences. 
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CHAPTER 5: MAINTAINING THE SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND INDPENDENCE OF  
 
THE LDS CHURCH AND ITS MEMBERS 
 
Despite having almost no warning about the impending disaster and no notion of 
the scope of the tragedy, the LDS Church, Red Cross, and local and federal government 
agencies responded quickly to the Teton Dam flood.  During what sociologist Allen H. 
Burton terms the “emergency phase” of the disaster in his work Communities in Disaster: 
A Sociological Analysis of Collective Stress Situations, the LDS community in the 
Rexburg area pulled together, following the Mormon tendency to work in a close 
community.119  When other agencies arrived to respond to the disaster they found 
themselves confronted with a unique cultural situation.  The historical relationship 
between the LDS Church and government institutions had been tense, leading both sides 
to proceed with caution when aiding victims of the disaster.  Working together during the 
first two weeks following the disaster, church and secular leaders expressed their new 
appreciation for each other’s efforts to rebuild the flood communities and support the 
victims.  
 LDS Church Welfare Services had aided in several disasters before the Teton 
Dam failure.  It sent food, emergency supplies, and medicine to Chile in 1960 following 
an earthquake and assisted flood victims in Utah, Idaho, and Nevada throughout the 
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1960s.120  Their first comprehensive and noteworthy emergency response involved the 
Teton Dam disaster, where they had to address the initial emergency phase and handle a 
long-term recovery period with a high percentage of affected church members.  The 
church succeeded in securing praise for its work in eastern Idaho.  Yet, a closer 
examination reveals only superficial accommodation of other parties involved in the 
recovery effort and a difficulty of members and church leaders in forsaking deeply 
entrenched Mormon beliefs and practices.  The tendency to value community above 
individual welfare, the importance of self-reliance rather than taking a perceived 
“handout,” and the church’s dominant role in influencing the lives of its members 
demonstrated an adherence to the original doctrinal principles of the church. 
 Relying too much on government aid and outside support by Mormons during the 
Great Depression led Heber J. Grant, then president of the church, to announce the 
organization of the Church Security Plan (later referred to as the Welfare Plan or System) 
during an April 1936 general meeting of the church membership.  He intended this 
organization to combat dependence among the members on federal relief and aid 
programs introduced in the 1930s.  One of the responsibilities of the church, according to 
Grant, involved taking care of the temporal needs of its members.  Tithing and fast 
offering donations would finance this welfare plan where local wards and stakes would 
assist local members first and then send any surplus to church headquarters where it 
could distribute it to other areas in need.121  The foundation of the program rested on 
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explicitly providing opportunities for the jobless to work, not only to help them earn an 
income, but to protect their sense of self-worth in the community.122   
 The Church Security Plan sought to help develop the spirituality of the members 
of the church.  The First Presidency agreed that addressing the temporal concerns of its 
members provided the best method to bolster spiritual growth within the church.  They 
believed that the Security Plan allowed the Saints to preserve their independence and 
self-respect by helping people help themselves.  Above all, claimed the First Presidency, 
“Our primary purpose was to set up, in so far as it might be possible, a system under 
which the curse of idleness would be done away with [and] the evils of the dole be 
abolished.”123 
 The church began construction in 1938 on a series of buildings to accommodate 
its new welfare plan collectively referred to as Welfare Square.  It built a root cellar, 
cannery, a bishop’s storehouse (similar to a supermarket where those in need can shop 
with a bishop’s order, an allowance that permitted them get necessities without paying 
money), milk-processing plant, and grain elevator.  Welfare Square produced all of its 
own goods: food products, shoes and clothes, and furniture.  To construct and staff 
Welfare Square, the church employed members, providing more jobs to the Mormon 
community.124  The willingness of members to embrace the new welfare plan by the 
1960s greatly pleased church leaders, and they claimed that it had unified the church and 
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increased spiritual growth from the top down.125  After successfully taking members 
through the Depression, the welfare plan looked beyond its own community to aiding 
victims of natural disasters and communities struggling with supplying basic needs 
throughout the world. 
 The welfare plan successfully sustained members of the church both temporally 
and spiritually by allowing them to address their own needs in a system devised by the 
church.  The hierarchy of the church also believed that they gained positive attention 
from the welfare plan after decades of negative press, persecution, and struggles with the 
local and federal governments.  Leonard Arrington discussed the identity issues that 
Mormons faced in the twentieth century, especially in adapting their church programs to 
the evolving lives of its members.  Arrington cited the welfare system as one of these 
adjustments in Mormon culture that successfully helped bring the Mormon Church into a 
constructive relationship with those within and outside the church.126 
Church welfare supplies and personnel arrived the night of the Teton Dam 
disaster and commenced in supporting the work that Ricks College did to help flood 
victims.  Stake presidents in the area primarily focused on keeping all of the various 
agencies efficient and organized and provided a local connection to the flood victims.  
This allowed church welfare system from Salt Lake City to direct its efforts to ensuring 
all involved parties handled the recovery in a manner that agreed with church teachings 
and doctrine.  This also provided the welfare system with a major opportunity to 
demonstrate on a larger stage its capabilities in an emergency scenario.  The church used 
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this prospect to foster positive interactions with non-members or critics of the church 
through an effective and comprehensive disaster response program. 
Richard “Dick” Barth, a member of the Church Disaster Committee and a 
supervisor of bulk storage and commodities within the Bishop’s Storehouse System, 
arrived in Rexburg Saturday night with the first welfare truck from Salt Lake.  The 
Church Disaster Committee formed shortly before or around an earthquake in Guatemala 
early in 1976 its initial experience of providing relief in an emergency disaster 
situation.127  The Teton Dam flood provided the first major test of the Church Disaster 
Committee because of its proximity to Salt Lake and the uniquely high concentration of 
Mormons in eastern Idaho. 
Barth quickly realized that the scope of the disaster was unparalleled in terms of 
property destruction.  The welfare system began sending food and clothing from its 
warehouses in the Salt Lake area.  In accordance with Mormon welfare beliefs of 
providing work for those seeking assistance, most of the labor involved with distributing 
the items to those in need came from the local community.  Too many volunteers quickly 
became a problem for Barth, who did not have enough tasks for everyone to perform.128 
 During the first few days, those working with Barth to distribute food, clothing, 
and other necessities did not completely conform to church welfare protocol and skipped 
filling out Bishop’s orders allowing people to take what they needed for immediate 
needs.  Bishop’s orders are forms filled out by a bishop and ward members or families 
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who require necessities from the Bishop’s storehouse.  The bishop and individual 
members decide together what items are essential and the bishop provides a signed form 
of what they can obtain from the welfare system.  After victims had their initial needs 
met local church members and non-members alike used Bishop’s orders to obtain various 
commodities from the welfare system.129   
 The church looked beyond the basic needs of its distressed members to address all 
aspects of their lives.  Members who had sons or daughters currently serving 
proselytizing missions for the church temporarily lost their ability to financially support 
their missionaries, so the welfare system stepped in to make the payments.130  The 
welfare system assumed all transportation costs and provided all their own labor from 
Welfare Square in Salt Lake City to the Manwaring Center at Ricks.  Barth also included 
in the total of church expenditures for this disaster any expenses that Ricks College 
incurred over its normal operating costs.131 
 The church carefully tried to ensure that it addressed all the needs of its members, 
however it also tried to help community members not of their faith.  A bishop’s 
responsibility lay within his ward boundaries and consisted of all people who lived in his 
vicinity regardless of membership status within the church, including those with no 
affiliation with the church at all.  Nonmembers theoretically had the same access to 
welfare commodities supplied by the church, the facilities and meals provided by Ricks, 
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and the support system that members within the church enjoyed.132  Church members 
understood that Christian principles inherent in Mormon doctrine compelled them to 
make certain that their neighbors had their needs met regardless of their religious 
affiliations.  Providing for nonmembers also served the less altruistic purpose of 
encouraging a positive view of church members, doctrines, and the welfare system. 
The fear of government welfare programs that developed within Mormonism 
from its beginnings and persisted into the 1970s quickly became an issue following the 
dam failure.  Governor Cecil Andrus visited eastern Idaho a week after the disaster, 
touring the flooded areas and speaking to the people in a meeting with LDS Church 
President Spencer W. Kimball.  Governor Andrus sensed that people in this vicinity 
struggled to accept aid from the government and other agencies.  He spoke about this 
issue with the president of Ricks College, Henry B. Eyring, following the meeting.  He 
told Eyring to explain to the LDS members in the area that the disaster presented a 
special circumstance where the government owed the people.  He also asked President 
Eyring for a written explanation of the church’s official policy on welfare so that he 
could inform the government agencies to conform to those standards.  Eyring observed 
that Governor Andrus recognized that the church lacked clarity in its guidelines 
pertaining to government welfare and needed to quickly solidify its position.133  Andrus’ 
recommendations that government agencies conform to Mormon protocols demonstrated 
his desire to accommodate the unique needs found in this region. 
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Shortly after Governor Andrus’ remarks about Mormon reluctance to accept 
government welfare, the church made clear its stance on welfare assistance from outside 
the church in a June 15, 1976, letter to stake presidents and bishops in Idaho.  It 
reaffirmed their counsel that members should not accept any type of welfare not earned 
through work.  They continued with specific direction for those involved in the Teton 
Dam disaster stating that the church anticipated that it could meet the immediate needs of 
its members and “encouraged [members] to look to the Church rather than to other 
sources for immediate relief of this kind.”  The First Presidency did feel that accepting 
loans, payments, or employment from the government was fitting in this situation, 
leaving any specific situations to the discretion of the individual and possibly his or her 
bishop.  The final warning issued by President Kimball cautioned that dependence on 
government welfare “is not only demoralizing but is unworthy of members of the 
Church” and cited a scripture from the Mormon canonical work The Doctrine and 
Covenants, 78:18, “Through my providence, notwithstanding the tribulation which shall 
descend upon you,…the Church may stand independent.”134  The First Presidency’s 
stance allowed for some outside welfare but in the same letter, they reinforced the caution 
members exhibited toward the government and its welfare and public assistance 
programs. 
Those working with the Red Cross immediately noticed a difference in response 
between previous disaster victims and the Mormon population of eastern Idaho.  The Red 
Cross established its main base of operations in Idaho Falls on Saturday night, and then 
established relief centers in Rexburg and Roberts.  Corry Tanner, a disaster coordinator 
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for the Salt Lake City division, explained the role of the Red Cross generally and with 
respect to the Teton Dam flood during a 1977 interview by Bruce Blumell.  At the relief 
centers flood victims received counseling about different types of aid available to help 
them deal with their losses from the disaster.  In Rexburg, Ricks College had addressed 
most of the immediate housing and food needs, so the Red Cross worked to supplement 
the efforts at the school.135  The Red Cross played a larger role in providing food in 
Menan and Roberts, smaller towns that had a delayed response to the disaster when 
floodwater three to four feet deep formed a lake rather than receding.136 
In addition to providing meals and food for people in the flood plain, the Red 
Cross assisted with clothing and other basic needs by providing comfort kits filled with 
toiletries and disbursing orders that functioned like checks or cash at stores in the area 
where victims could purchase necessities.  The Red Cross paid merchants for disbursing 
orders they fulfilled, believing that having new clothes rather than used items raises the 
self-esteem of disaster victims.  This system helped to financially support local 
businesses that suffered from the disaster as well.137  Red Cross workers and volunteers 
found that although many people living below the dam had only the clothes on their back, 
they hesitated to take any type of aid from the Red Cross. 
The First Presidency of the church had made it clear to members that they should 
utilize the church welfare system first to fulfill their needs.  Some members struggled to 
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justify taking anything from a non-church agency, an issue that many Red Cross and 
government workers from outside the area found surprising.  The honesty of those 
affected by the Teton Dam disaster also struck those who had participated in other relief 
efforts where many people tried to secure more aid than they needed.138  Although the 
Red Cross is not a government agency, workers sensed an undercurrent of wariness of 
what victims perceived as any type of government involvement or assistance.139 
Initially the workers in the Red Cross and government agencies from outside the 
area supposed that the people involved in the Teton Dam disaster lacked gratitude for the 
assistance they provided.140  Rexburg East Stake President Keith L. Peterson admitted 
that in a meeting the day after the flood at Ricks, local church leadership had a rocky 
beginning to their relationship with the Red Cross.  Peterson declared that members in the 
area had availed themselves of too much aid from the Red Cross.  While Peterson stated 
that many church members had contributed to the Red Cross in the past, justifying some 
assistance from outside the church, he argued that “[the Red Cross] distributed too much 
money here, and our people took too much money on clothing allowances and other 
things.  I think over a million dollars was the last figure I heard.”141  Even though many 
Mormons in the area had actually donated to the Red Cross, some church leaders 
maintained that members should not utilize the Red Cross as their primary source of 
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relief.  Local leaders followed the First Presidency’s directive regarding welfare and 
reinforced the aloof, closed sense of community that dominated the early years of 
Mormonism. 
Notwithstanding the tenuous beginning between the LDS Church and the Red 
Cross, both sides admitted that once communication improved, it fostered a greater 
appreciation of  each other’s contributions to the relief effort.  Keith Peterson 
acknowledged that the Red Cross could “do some things that the Church can’t do” and 
that the church needed to learn how to interact with various other emergency relief 
agencies in the future.142  Tanner attributed the Mormon hesitancy to accept aid to an 
inability on the victims’ part to comprehend the magnitude of the disaster and the failure 
of the church to indicate clearly its position on accepting welfare and other types of non-
church aid.  Ultimately Tanner believed that most of the Red Cross workers accepted the 
unique situation presented by a largely Mormon population.  He was even impressed 
when people returned their unused disbursement orders either because there were 
inadvertent duplications or they realized that their losses were not as bad as originally 
thought.143  According to Tanner, the Red Cross eventually sensed that they had worked 
successfully in this distinctive environment.  Tanner’s interview also shows that despite 
some improvement, the Mormon residents remained cautious of outside assistance and 
their religious leaders sustained their attitude. 
 Even in situations where interactions between the local population and 
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government agencies seemed to work smoothly, church leaders later regretted having to 
rely on that agency at all.  Temporary housing quickly became a top priority of the 
recovery effort due to the massive loss of property and the federal government sent HUD 
to address this need.  Bruce Blumell interviewed Carlos Renteria, the director of 
application assistance for the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) at the Teton Dam disaster, to understand the role of this agency and 
its reception in a largely Mormon community.  Renteria had represented HUD on 
approximately fourteen disasters before his experience in Idaho in 1976 and explained to 
Blumell how HUD operated in a typical disaster situation.  Disaster victims whose homes 
sustained enough damage to make them unlivable filed an application with HUD.  An 
inspector verified the level of damage; if it was severe, HUD made other housing 
arrangements, mobile homes in this particular case.  If the home sustained minor damage, 
HUD assisted the homeowner in making minimal repairs, bringing the home to a livable 
condition so that the homeowner could reside on the premises while continuing to restore 
it.144 
 Without phones or people living at regular addresses, HUD found it difficult to 
locate, communicate with, and assist victims in the disaster area.  The organization of the 
local LDS Church aided HUD in overcoming these setbacks.  Stake presidents and 
bishops had already met with the members of their wards and stakes and compiled a list 
reporting their assessment of homes in their respective jurisdictions.  Using this list, HUD 
visited the homes before people even had to apply, accompanied by local church leaders 
so that when applications did come in they had only to verify their findings on the list and 
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could accelerate the process of getting individuals into a more stable living situation.  
Renteria affirmed that HUD was “pretty lucky” with this particular situation and he 
praised the LDS Church for being “so well organized.”145 
 HUD processed all eligible applications for some type of temporary housing in an 
astounding sixty days.  By December 1976, HUD had reduced its caseload by half with 
only twelve hundred families or individuals continuing to rely on the organization for 
their housing needs.  The local HUD office director in Rexburg, Victor Gonzalez, 
attributed this exceptional efficiency to “the assisted families in this area [who] have 
exhibited a great deal of independence and self-sufficiency, and with their help we may 
finish our job early.”146  The Mormon influence on the response went beyond the general 
and local church leaders to the members who closely adhered to the LDS tenets of self-
reliance and independence.  The church leadership streamlined HUD’s process by 
providing a vital pathway for quick communication between the agency and the people in 
Rexburg while the victims and outside volunteers worked rapidly to restore any homes 
that could be repaired quickly, freeing up HUD temporary properties. 
 A few minor instances of people becoming impatient with the HUD process 
occurred, but residents below the Teton Dam expressed their pleasure with the work that 
HUD did and the caliber of personnel who served them.  The LDS Church also agreed 
that its relationship with HUD had worked smoothly and provided excellent service to 
flood victims.  However, some local church leaders perceived that Mormon independence 
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in a disaster could be increased in the future, eliminating the need for any aid from 
outside agencies such as HUD.  Stake President Howard Hillam of the Idaho Falls South 
Stake declared that “we have had an opportunity to put the Church to a test, if you will, 
so far as their abilities to help one another.  I am totally convinced that the Church can do 
whatever it wants, because of the great faith of the Saints.”147  While Renteria and HUD 
generally found their involvement in a population dominated by Mormons successful, the 
church leadership continued with caution to involve themselves with outside agencies.  
Church leaders saw any loss of self-sufficiency by the church as a weakness that needed 
rectification in the future. 
 While church leadership and many members struggled to accept any type of aid 
from non-LDS or government organizations, they found government loans acceptable.  
The Small Business Administration (SBA) moved into the Rexburg area to promote the 
recovery of local businesses with government financial assistance.  By paying off the 
existing mortgage of the business and then providing a new thirty-year loan at an 
affordable interest rate, a business affected by the disaster could literally start over.  The 
church readily supported aid of this type because leaders saw a distinction between loans 
and “handouts” and used local priesthood to assist this agency as well.148  Although 
people generally believed that the Bureau of Reclamation would have to make full 
financial restitution, including paying off any SBA loans, the loans promoted a quicker 
physical and economic recovery in the Upper Snake River Valley.  Dan Ward, the 
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Regional Director of SBA from Seattle, asserted that the church ultimately helped the 
SBA and other agencies perform their duties in eastern Idaho.  He stated, “Never before 
in a disaster have federal agencies had access to so much volunteer help in providing 
information, dispelling rumors, locating disaster victims, assisting with loss 
documentation and inpediting [sic, expediting?]  applications for financial help.”149 
 Although LDS Church policies and general sentiment from the leadership clearly 
resisted attempts by outside organizations to provide material help to members in eastern 
Idaho, the nature of the Teton Dam disaster required some accommodation by entrenched 
sentiments of self-sufficiency.  The process to determine what the government would do 
financially for the victims began on June 8, 1976, when the Under Secretary of the 
Interior D. Kent Frizzel established the Interior Teton Dam Failure Review Group (IRG) 
to investigate the causes of the failure.  The U.S. Department of the Interior and the State 
of Idaho (Independent Panel) also commissioned an investigation into the contributing 
factors of the failure of the Teton Dam.  The IRG published its report in April of 1977, 
and the Independent Panel’s report issued its report in January of 1977.150  Interim reports 
shortly after the failure of the dam, issued on July 14, 1976, provided a hypothesis based 
on initial tests at the dam site that the dam failed at a design level.  The reliance on the 
elaborate grouting curtain “inhibited adoption of other design features that could have 
prevented the failure.”  Ultimately the design of the dam proved inadequate for the  
unique geological issues present in the Teton Canyon.151  Because both panels attributed 
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the failure of the dam to a faulty design rather than an earthquake or other natural 
occurrence, they asserted that the Bureau of Reclamation and ultimately the federal 
government must bear financial responsibility for the damage caused by the failure.  In 
1976, the Teton Dam failure was the worst dam disaster in terms of property damage in 
history, with the bill estimated at one billion dollars in 1976.152 
 After the initial report, people began to realize that the federal government was 
entirely at fault for the disaster and wondered when the government would reimburse the 
victims for their losses.  Some, like Stake President Keith Peterson, believed the 
government would find any way it could to avoid financial responsibility for the 
catastrophe.153  U.S. Senator from Idaho James A. McClure lobbied hard in Washington, 
D.C. along with Representative George Hansen for full financial restitution for the Teton 
Dam disaster victims.  After declaring five Idaho counties disaster areas, President Gerald 
Ford then asked Congress for legislation that would provide two hundred million dollars 
to victims immediately.  Ten days later, the federal government began to administer the 
funds in eastern Idaho.154  Senator McClure knew that the initial payment would not 
come close to covering the total losses in the Upper Snake River Valley.155  While the 
initial reports by the federal government and the Bureau clearly indicated that they were 
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responsible for the damage, President Ford never admitted any fault on the part of the 
government.  He stated, “No government has the power to eliminate tragedy from human 
experience, but government can and government should act quickly to minimize the pain 
of a great disaster and help to begin the healing process.”156 
 On September 7, 1976, President Ford signed the Teton Dam Bill; leaving the 
amount of money the government would compensate the people open to allow a full 
restitution for flood victims.  President Mark G. Ricks of the Rexburg Stake maintained 
that most eastern Idahoans changed their negative view of the federal government when 
they sensed they had received more compensation than they had anticipated earlier in the 
summer.157 
 Providing compensation in a highly concentrated Mormon population also 
presented a unique set of issues.  The nature of the disaster itself provided one of the first 
instances with the reimbursement of disaster victims due to culpability of the federal 
government.  The head claims officer in Rexburg asserted that he believed as high as 
ninety percent of the claims were legitimate with about ten percent considered 
questionable.158  Many Mormons still expressed some reluctance in accepting this type of 
money, despite being entitled to it under the circumstances.  Stake President Keith 
Peterson reported that many government claims workers conceded that many people did 
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not request enough money to cover their losses.  Peterson claimed that government 
officials, early in the process, expressed concern that some of the older people had not 
considered inflation and would not request enough money to replace the lost items at 
their current price.159 
 Government officials may have agreed that the claims process proceeded honestly 
with most errors bordering on claiming too little rather than too much; yet, in their own 
communities, many Mormons articulated the concern in their oral history interviews that 
their neighbors or people they knew had taken advantage of the reimbursement process.  
These oral history interviews demonstrate the pervasive nature of this allegation, with 
people hearing rumors about fraudulent claims, but not personally knowing of anyone 
abusing the system.  While Peterson expressed his opinion that there were a few 
“outlandish claims,” most of the concern about these exaggerated losses was pure 
supposition.160  Rumors of this nature revealed that many in these eastern Idaho LDS 
communities feared that their neighbors might suppose they had relied too much on the 
government or had not been completely honest.  Mormons had more latitude in their 
approach to their claims according to the First Presidency letter mentioned earlier, but 
many members agonized about what they could justifiably claim and what would mean 
too much reliance on money from the government.  Many also critically judged their 
neighbors’ claims by this standard.  
 The Teton Dam failure provided the LDS Church with its first major opportunity 
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to test the emergency response aspect of its welfare program and justify its adherence to a 
doctrine of self-reliance.  Those inside and outside the church deemed the Mormon 
welfare response a triumph.  Church leadership and many members found less success in 
navigating the offerings of other agencies sent to assist in the recovery effort.  The 
entrenched doctrine of self-sufficiency and the widespread wariness of the government 
perpetuated by leaders to the general membership in eastern Idaho prevented Mormon 
flood victims from fully utilizing assistance from government agencies.  In some cases, 
such as the Red Cross, this adherence to self-sufficiency caused friction between church 
leaders and leaders of other organizations.  On the surface, it looked as though the church 
had moved forward in an effort to work amicably with government agencies according to 
the vantage point of many church leaders.  Looking at oral histories from both church 
leaders and government officials demonstrates that church members actually maintained 
their abhorrence of outside welfare efforts while the government and Red Cross altered 
their approaches to promote a positive working relationship. 
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CHAPTER 6:  BLURRING THE LINES BETWEEN PRIESTHOOD AND CIVIL  
 
LEADERSHIP 
  
 The leadership hierarchy of the LDS Church greatly influenced the recovery 
process in eastern Idaho following the collapse of the Teton Dam.  The church relies on 
stake presidents and bishops or branch presidents for local leadership.  The men ordained 
to these positions have received no previous formal religious training and do not receive 
financial compensation for their time or service.  A bishop and his two counselors, 
comprising a bishopric, oversee a congregation, referred to as a ward, that encompasses 
around three to six hundred people.161  A stake, presided over by a stake president and his 
two counselors, composed of five to twelve wards and is the intermediate unit of 
organization between a ward and church headquarters.162  Bishops and stake presidents 
derive their authority from the Mormon priesthood, “the power and authority by which 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is organized and directed.”163  The term 
priesthood has several meanings in Mormonism, but in this analysis, it will denote the 
local, male leadership of the church.  The priesthood leaders in eastern Idaho performed 
several tasks to streamline the recovery process such as communicating between local 
members and church headquarters, mediating the relationship between members and 
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government agencies, and keeping both church and outside groups organized and focused 
on the recovery of the community.  The role the priesthood played in several 
circumstances following the disaster showed a desire to accommodate the government 
agencies, but not at the price of losing primary access to church members and 
relinquishing the independence of the overall church organization.  The priesthood served 
to maintain the close connection between local members and church headquarters.  It 
interceded, as much as possible, in interactions between members and outside agencies.  
This relationship between members and priesthood leaders was another protective buffer 
of the church’s overall independence. 
 The priesthood leaders in eastern Idaho quickly went into action to fulfill their 
perceived immediate duty of ensuring that their neighbors had safely evacuated and that 
they had notified church headquarters in Salt Lake of the disaster.  President Sonderegger 
of the Rexburg North Stake placed a call to the office overseeing the welfare system of 
the church and called several times on June 5 to keep church headquarters updated on the 
growing disaster.164  The night of the dam collapse, several stake presidents met with 
bishops, their counselors, and other priesthood holders in wards to work on locating any 
individuals or families who were missing.  In this meeting the stake presidents announced 
that they would follow the priesthood line of authority, meaning that if a bishop could not 
be accounted for, the next priesthood holder in line would assume the bishop’s 
responsibilities.  Using this chain of command, they could quickly locate any victims that 
remained unaccounted for and ensure that everyone within a ward had a place to stay for 
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the night.165 
 On Sunday night, June 6, the church leaders in the area prepared to organize the 
recovery effort that would allow them to rebuild their homes and towns.166  The county 
commissioners (also members of the LDS Church) met with local stake presidents to 
confirm that they would use the organization of the church to coordinate other local, 
state, and federal programs once they arrived in Rexburg.  On Monday morning, the 
county commissioners held their first meeting in the Army Reserve building.  These 
meetings continued at the same time every day for several months until they tapered off 
to a weekly and then monthly occurrence.  Representatives from various government 
agencies attended the meetings alongside local church leaders to determine what needed 
to be done and which organization was the best equipped to handle it.167 
 The county commissioners agreed that any programs relating specifically to the 
people involved in the flood should first go through the stake presidents.  This division of 
labor allowed the county commissioners to focus solely on repairing public facilities 
while the church would assume responsibility for the people in the flood zone.168  Dell 
Klingler, a county commissioner and member of the church, asserted that “if we as 
commissioners would have had to set up the kind of organization that we had organized 
in the Church, it would have taken months, and that would have been by far our biggest 
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effort.”169  Klingler’s remark proved true; the priesthood organization streamlined the 
recovery process for the victims by increasing the efficiency of the other involved 
organizations.  This initial decision by the county commissioners to rely so heavily on the 
LDS Church, made before any government agencies arrived in eastern Idaho, also 
demonstrated a desire to maintain the preexisting hierarchy.  The stake presidents and 
bishops would mediate most contact between the primarily Mormon flood victims and 
the government programs sent to the area. 
The federal government agencies attended their first correlation meeting on 
Thursday June 8, in Idaho Falls.  Mark G. Ricks, a local rancher and president of the 
Rexburg Stake, attended on behalf of the church, where he met with representatives from 
the Federal Disaster Assistance Agency (FDAA), HUD, and the SBA.  The county 
commissioners represented the local government at the meeting with Civil Defense 
representing the State of Idaho.170   
Ricks waited and listened to what the government representatives had to say and 
then informed them that using the organization of the LDS Church would expedite their 
efforts on this particular disaster.  He also notified them that they had already initiated 
recovery efforts and counseled the flood victims not to hesitate in beginning the cleanup 
and repair process.  Ricks described concisely how the welfare system of the church 
functioned and explained, “the Church was organized and ready to reach people.”  Ricks 
recalled how many of the government representatives approached him after the meeting 
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and expressed their interest and approval of utilizing the church organization to direct the 
recovery efforts.171 
The priesthood organization of the LDS Church essentially took on the traditional 
role of the FDAA in coordinating the other federal programs.  Hugh Fowler, a 
representative of the FDAA explained this unique arrangement to Bruce Blumell in an 
interview following the disaster.  Blumell asked if Fowler knew of any problems between 
the FDAA and the church’s ecclesiastical structure, and Fowler replied:  
We’ve utilized them (local stake presidents) and gone to them quite heavily.  I’ve 
 asked them if there were people living out in their wards or their stakes who are 
 non-LDS, and I’ve been assured that they were treated—and I’m sure this is 
 true—just the same as everybody else.  I have no misgivings or anything.  I am 
 just very, very grateful for the way they’ve handled it.172 
 
Additional evidence to support Fowler’s assessment is difficult to find, but it 
demonstrates that both Fowler and Blumell wanted this positive evaluation of the local 
priesthood’s work during the recovery period to be true. 
To maintain their own organization, the local stake presidents who worked with 
government agencies also held daily meetings with the bishops in their stakes.  These 
stake presidents advised their bishops to hold daily meetings with the members of their 
respective wards.  The purpose of these meetings, according to President Sonderegger, 
was to keep people informed and to dispel rumors.  The bishops assured their 
congregations that they could trust the accuracy of the information they provided, and if 
they inadvertently gave false information, they would attempt to correct it 
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immediately.173  Sonderegger believed that these meetings and the availability of 
information despite a total breakdown in normal channels of communication helped 
prevent widespread panic, psychological problems, or depression among the victims.174 
President Ricks recalled how he thought these correlation meetings assisted the 
government agencies in effectively meeting the needs of the victims.  Referring to the 
SBA, Ricks explained a typical conversation at one of the meetings: “Tell us what your 
program is.  We don’t know anything about it.  We need to know so that we can pass the 
information on to our people.”175  After the meeting, local priesthood leaders would 
disseminate the details to their ward members.  This method prevented inaccurate 
information from spreading and gave flood victims a clear idea of the different avenues 
of aid available from the federal government.  It also reinforced the dependence of 
members on their local priesthood leaders rather than government agencies. 
HUD relied a great deal on the priesthood to address the housing issues in the 
Rexburg area.  Carlos Renteria described the problems that HUD faced in eastern Idaho, 
particularly the inability to effectively communicate with the victims because the flood 
had damaged the phone lines.  By asking a bishop, HUD could easily find an individual 
or notify them through the bishop that they needed to communicate with them.  Bishops, 
in many cases, had already compiled lists of people in their ward boundaries describing 
the level of damage to their property, which greatly increased the efficiency of HUD’s 
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operations in eastern Idaho.176  When HUD struggled to meet the needs of flood victims 
in Sugar City, they used the local bishop as a liaison and actually allowed him to make 
temporary housing assignments.  The bishop assured Renteria that he would work with 
all the victims in the area and not just those who belonged to the LDS Church.177 
Using the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the church proved beneficial, but came with 
unusual requests.  The church did not intend to do any work on Sundays and asked the 
other agencies to respect and comply with this custom.  Many government agencies 
completely shut down non-essential operations on Sunday to comply with this request.  
Local church leaders and LDS welfare representative Richard Barth also informed the 
agency issuing food stamps and the Red Cross that members would not avail themselves 
of these “handouts.”  While many people did take advantage of these programs, both 
groups left the area on June 20 due to dwindling need by the victims.178   
 Even with the distinctive requests of the LDS Church and its membership, the 
emergency phase of the recovery effort exceeded expectations from many agencies.  
HUD believed that by using the organizational system of the church it finished its initial 
housing evaluation six weeks sooner than in all previous disasters at which they had 
worked.  Other government agencies, according to Barth, also found that they could 
easily exceed how many people they processed in a six-day workweek rather than their 
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usual seven-day schedule.179  By using a preexisting system with people who already 
trusted and knew each other, rather than leadership from outside the disaster area who do 
not understand the distinctive nature of this particular community, agencies could work 
more efficiently.  Using local church leaders and volunteers also assisted these outside 
agencies in their responsibilities.   
 The FDAA’s allowance of and the local priesthood’s insistence on coordinating 
and dictating the terms of the relief effort following the collapse of the dam obviously 
made the entire recovery process more efficient.  Nevertheless, any type of compromise 
between the LDS Church and the government agencies appears to arise from the federal 
government rather than the church.  The LDS members directly affected by the flood 
soon moved on from a deep-seated undercurrent of state and federal government mistrust, 
to an appreciation of the employees of various government agencies that assisted them 
through the emergency phase of the disaster.  Henry B. Eyring observed that the Mormon 
conception of the “dirty government and […] the government and bureaucracy that have 
to be watched” evolved because of the close contact between government agencies and 
Mormons in the Rexburg area.  Eyring asserted that he had “never seen as many 
sensitive, competent, honest executives of business—as I’ve seen in HUD, and SBA, and 
the Bureau of Reclamation in this whole situation.  And the state people.”180 
 President Keith Peterson agreed with Eyring’s assessment that state and federal 
government agencies treated the church and its members respectfully.  Peterson believed 
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that only a few minor incidents of misunderstanding occurred between the church and the 
government, but they did not affect the overall sense of cooperation for the duration of 
the disaster response.  Feeling so strongly about the future attitude of church members 
toward the government, Peterson shared his opinion: “You know, in the Church there are 
a number of people who are consistently trying to teach us that the government’s bad and 
that we shouldn’t participate with them and so on.  And I think that’s a disservice to our 
people.”  He argued in favor of greater cooperation and asserted that “the government is 
set up to serve our needs, we shouldn’t fear it or deprecate it.  I think we need to use 
it.”181  Peterson’s comment reveals the role the LDS Church occasionally played as a 
barrier between its members and the government agencies.  While the federal government 
seemed to readily accommodate the unique situation presented by a large concentration 
of Mormons, the church seemed reluctant to relinquish its influence on its members or 
easily forget its long-standing tension with the federal government. 
 Relations between the government and the church seemed to remain helpful and 
positive, but the church experienced some friction in its relationship with the Red Cross.  
The church welfare system eagerly tried to meet every need of those affected by the 
flood, but the welfare products and services provided and the benefits of the 
organizational system came with certain requirements.  Richard Barth personally made it 
clear Sunday night following the dam failure that the church would organize the relief 
effort.  He told a Red Cross representative from Oregon that the Red Cross would not 
perform its usual duties as the first organization on the scene with the power to make 
decisions regarding how the recovery effort would proceed.  Barth remarked in his oral 
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history interview with Bruce Blumell that this Red Cross representative was upset, 
“because he’d never run into an organization like the Church before.  He just could not 
comprehend what could be done.  I guess he just assumed it would be chaos.”182  
Eventually the relationship between the church and the Red Cross became amicable and 
ran more smoothly after their initial encounter. 
The biggest issue that arose between the church and the Red Cross had stemmed 
from a lack of communication between the two agencies and between the church and its 
members.  Both organizations later agreed that an increased level of understanding would 
salvage the relationship for upcoming disaster responses.  Cory Tanner, the Red Cross 
representative during the recovery period, discussed the efforts of the national 
organization of the Red Cross and church headquarters to formalize their relationship 
with the church and address any communication problems that arose during the Teton 
Dam disaster.  Like President Peterson, Tanner acknowledged that the church welfare 
system had a lot to offer in terms of emergency relief situations and a formalized 
agreement would increase their ability to cooperate in the future.183 
 Local priesthood leaders made several recommendations about how the 
priesthood organization functioned on a local level.  Most of the responsibility and work 
resulting from the disaster response fell on the local stake presidents and bishops.  Under 
this level, the high priest group and elder’s quorum in each ward should have received 
assignments from their bishops to assist him with his duties.  Below the quorum level, the 
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most basic priesthood assignment in the church is the home teaching responsibility, 
where leaders assign a priesthood holder several families in his ward to visit each month 
and assist in any type of emergency.  The home teaching network provides the most 
direct communication between ward members and the church.184  President Peterson and 
other local leaders argued that in the Teton Dam disaster the basic priesthood 
organizations initially failed to support the bishop or stake president in his duties.  
Peterson emphasized, “If a man has a priesthood stewardship and a priesthood 
responsibility, he can’t get too busy with his own affairs.  He’s got to function […] we 
had a lot of priesthood leaders who got so concerned with their own affairs that they 
didn’t function very well.”185  When quorums and priesthood holders in wards failed to 
prioritize the welfare of the group over their individual needs, Peterson asserted that these 
men had neglected church teachings regarding priesthood stewardships.  Peterson’s 
comment demonstrated, that despite an initial breakdown in the hierarchy he still adhered 
to the church principle and practice of placing the welfare of the group over that of the 
individual.   
 President Mark Ricks recalled that the bishops in the area became so burdened by 
the day-to-day problems in their wards that their own homes and properties became 
neglected.  The wives and families of these bishops expressed dismay because the bishop 
had to spend all of his time with ward members and had no time for them.  Ricks 
contended that the bishops needed to delegate more to the quorums in their wards.  They, 
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in turn, needed to fulfill their assignments, which would have spread the responsibilities 
out, allowing everyone in the ward to have some time to address their personal 
obligations.  A lack of communication and no prior precedent for a disaster of this nature 
within the church, Ricks believed, contributed to less mobilization by lower priesthood 
positions.186  In a later interview with Blumell, Ricks stated that the lower echelons of the 
priesthood started functioning according to standard church protocol at the end of July, 
when most of the chaos had subsided.187 
 The Relief Society, a women’s organization within the church that emphasizes 
service, became somewhat neglected by local priesthood leaders in the area.  General 
Relief Society President Barbara Smith reported to Bruce Blumell several volunteer 
projects that the Relief Society initiated in the Rexburg area.  Local Relief Societies 
arranged to feed people several meals a day from chapel kitchens.  They also started a 
nursery program where several women would watch children during the day at Ricks 
College while their parents worked to clean up their homes.188  Despite the amount of 
work they did in the community to address the needs of the victims, local priesthood 
leaders failed to include Relief Society presidents in daily meetings.  Local Relief 
Societies also did not have clear expectations regarding what their role during the disaster 
should be.  Blumell, in his article “The LDS Response to the Teton Dam Disaster in 
Idaho,” attributed this disregard for the Relief Societies in the area to the aforementioned 
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problems with communication.  Despite little direction from their priesthood leaders, 
most Relief Societies organized themselves to tackle any disaster-related issues within 
their ward boundaries.189  While the Relief Society organization does not necessarily 
need direction from the priesthood, it does need some of its actions sanctioned by an 
overseeing priesthood leader.  Although the local Relief Societies did not get the 
opportunity to attend the correlation meetings, they provided many types of service to aid 
flood victims in the summer of 1976. 
 The local priesthood leaders functioned remarkably well considering the 
catastrophic level of damage inflicted by the Teton Dam failure.  Those with official 
leadership positions such as bishops or stake presidents carried out their duties as 
proscribed by their respective office.  Priesthood holders in the levels of responsibility 
below a bishop struggled to fulfill their obligations with the same attention as the bishops 
or stake presidents due to a lack of communication within the ward or stake or the 
severity of their own situation following the flood.  Most local priesthood leaders also 
neglected to fully utilize the Relief Society, and excluded female members of the LDS 
Church in leadership positions from actively participating in the decision-making process 
of the recovery effort. 
 In spite of the shortcomings many church leaders perceived in their own response 
to the disaster, some, like Henry B. Eyring, saw the larger situation as “a great moment in 
Church History.”  He gave “high marks” to Presidents Ricks, Peterson, and Sonderegger 
and other leaders for quickly adapting to the situation and to the people of the Upper 
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Snake River Valley for their heroism.190  The new disaster manual produced by the 
church following the flood had input from the Relief Society and all the priesthood 
quorums involved and addressed LDS disaster response on a personal, ward, stake, and 
church-wide level.191  Because of their efficiency, Eyring believed that government 
agencies would emulate some of the church methods of disaster response and rely more 
on the church in the future.  Eyring believed that from this experience, the next time an 
agency responded anywhere around the country they would say, “Where are the 
Mormons?”192 
 Many of the local leaders, according to oral history accounts, saw the perception 
of the church by government organizations and outside agencies change during their 
interactions throughout the summer months of 1976.  Eyring recalled an experience 
where the Idaho Statesman in Boise had raised fifty thousand dollars for the disaster 
victims, and rather than give it to the Red Cross to distribute, they chose Eyring and 
Ricks College to select people to receive the Statesman money.  Eyring considered the 
circumstance of a “historically anti-Mormon newspaper” trusting an LDS college to be a 
sign that the Teton Dam failure successfully improved the relationship between 
Mormons, state and federal government agencies, and other secular organizations.193  The 
church looked to its welfare program to encourage a positive opinion of its practices and 
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teachings and secured this praise for their work with the Teton Dam.  They also received 
positive feedback from the government representatives sent to eastern Idaho for their 
organizational structure led by local priesthood leaders. 
 The reaction by priesthood leaders to laudatory press and comments they thought 
the church received for their efforts during the disaster recovery showed an attempt by 
the church to actively seek greater acceptance in the U.S. of their unique way of doing 
things.  The church focused on improving relations with other agencies as well as 
government organizations to promote the idea of a new, more cooperative LDS Church.  
While they believed themselves successful in securing a better image for the church, they 
also managed to maintain their unique principles and practices.  Local priesthood leaders 
monopolized the avenues of communication between government agencies and the flood 
victims.  The cooperation and compromise came mostly from the government agencies 
and organizations outside the church who allowed the priesthood leaders to coordinate 
their efforts and dictate to their wards and stakes what types of government or Red Cross 
assistance would be acceptable to receive.  Any outside acceptance of Mormon welfare 
and organizational systems came without altering their methods or beliefs.  Most of the 
accommodation arose from the government agencies or Red Cross who found themselves 
in the minority for the duration of this disaster. 
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CHAPTER 7: ORGANIZING AN ARMY OF VOLUNTEERS  
  
 In addition to coordinating with government agencies, local priesthood leaders 
also organized their own volunteer effort to assist homeowners in the flood zone to clean 
the mud and debris from their homes and properties.  The ability of the victims to quickly 
repair and restore their homes resulted from thousands of volunteers from Idaho, Utah, 
Wyoming, and Canada who worked in various capacities to restore the flood-ravaged 
homes in the Upper Snake River Valley.  The stake presidents in the area took control of 
the volunteer labor to maximize the work done, ensuring that electricians and other 
skilled workers were sent to the correct areas, the proper amount of workers were 
assigned to a home, and that the necessary tools and equipment were available.  The 
organization of volunteer labor by local priesthood leaders demonstrated the communal 
spirit typical of the early LDS Church, and the church used this effort to generate a better 
image of the church. 
 With supplies and money flooding into the disaster zone, only the copious 
amounts of mud and debris hindered the recovery process.  Janet Hibbert of Sugar City 
recalled the daunting task she and her husband Larry had before them with mud reaching 
the bottom of their basement windows, approximately four feet deep.  Hibbert expressed 
despair as she viewed the task in front of her, “It seemed impossible, and I surely felt like 
an ant with such a big undertaking ahead of me.”  Soon after the flood, a group of 
teenagers came to her home with “fishing waders, buckets, shovels, and gloves” and 
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assisted the Hibberts in removing the mud from their basement.194  If homes had survived 
the flood and remained mostly intact on their foundations, mud and all manner of debris 
filled their structures.  Any type of recovery endeavor had to address the need for a 
substantial volunteer effort to eradicate the mud, garbage, and wreckage from people’s 
homes, farms, and businesses. 
 President Sonderegger suggested to other stake presidents in the affected region 
that stake presidents who escaped the flood each take one of the wards in the disaster 
areas and assist with the recovery effort until completed.  President Sonderegger trusted 
his idea was the result of divine inspiration; an answer to his earnest prayers for help.  
The church lacked a precedent for this type of assistance, causing some initial 
disagreement between the priesthood leaders in the Rexburg area and those stake 
presidents or bishops outside the area regarding how to organize such an effort.195  The 
outside stakes originally contributed welfare items to the wards and stakes church 
headquarters had assigned them to help.  After they had taken care of the initial needs of 
the ward, President Harold Hillam of the Idaho Falls South Stake, began organizing 
crews of volunteer laborers to go into Rexburg, Sugar City, and other damaged cities to 
start digging out the mud and debris about a week after the flood.196  In a correlation 
meeting with the stake presidents, General Brooks of Civil Defense agreed that they 
needed hundreds of man-hours just for the clean-up process (a bishop in Sugar City 
estimated that an average house in his ward required around four hundred hours to merely 
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remove the mud and clean the house).197  For a week, President Hillam had around three 
thousand volunteers a day arriving in buses from surrounding areas in Idaho, Utah, and 
Wyoming to put in a full day’s work.  On Saturday June 19, they had five thousand 
volunteers, their biggest volunteer day during the recovery period of the disaster.198 
 Stake presidents within Rexburg decided on a daily basis how many volunteers 
their stake needed and let President Hillam know.  He then assigned stakes outside the 
area to bring a certain number of volunteers or equipment and report to their location the 
next day.  In many cases, these stakes sent more laborers or machinery than President 
Hillam requested.  He had called several regional priesthood representatives (who 
oversee several stakes in one region) to request front-end loaders, asking for five or six.  
The regional representative in Soda Springs returned his call letting Hillam know that 
they had located one hundred and fifty.  The volunteers coming to the area also donated 
more than just their work, according to Hillam.  He explained to Blumell in an interview 
how humbled the busloads of volunteers made him feel who “had been up since 3:30 and 
4:00 a.m. to make that trip and come and spend a hard day’s work, furnishing their own 
lunch, paying for their own transportation, and then getting back on the bus tired and 
dirty and heading back home.”199 
 After the June 19 volunteer day, the clean-up efforts progressed rapidly, 
necessitating specialized volunteers to help people make their homes livable.  Working 
with another stake president, President Yost, Hillam started bringing in electricians to 
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restore power to individual homes.  Hillam wanted around one hundred and fifty 
electricians and Yost sent him between four and five hundred.  Hillam instructed local 
bishops to reimburse the electricians from their fast offering fund for any supplies they 
used.  Most of the electricians decided to forego the reimbursement, donating their time, 
trucks, and supplies.  This service alone saved many homeowners hundreds of dollars, 
and a city electrical inspector stated that without this particular volunteer effort most 
homes would have waited for months to have electricity restored.200 
 The bulk of the outside volunteer labor lasted around two weeks with people from 
Idaho Falls donating around three hundred thousand man-hours during this period and 
28,000 volunteers pouring in from surrounding areas, not including Idaho Falls.201  Hugh 
Fowler, the deputy regional director of the FDAA, complimented the church and its 
members throughout an oral history interview with Bruce Blumell.  He maintained that 
he had exceptional cooperation and patience from the people involved when compared to 
other disasters he had encountered.  Fowler also showed gratitude for the volunteer 
program organized by the Church and expressed that, “it speeded things up 
immensely.”202 
 While the FDAA and others were very complimentary toward the volunteer 
efforts, many of the local church leaders, who were also grateful for outside help, argued 
that they could have improved on the organizational aspects of their effort.  President 
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Sonderegger believed that the organizational system he initiated began to break down, 
with too many volunteers and a lack of clear communication between the disaster area 
and outside stakes assigned to help.  Sonderegger stated that his original system of one 
“helper” stake for each stake in the flood zone would have kept the system more 
organized, but many other people believed that Rexburg needed an enormous amount of 
volunteers from the region to deal with the great destruction in the area.203  Too many 
volunteers may sound like an enviable problem in a disaster situation, but President 
Hillam explained that the biggest concern with this specific issue was guaranteeing that 
he did not waste the volunteers’ time due to poor organization.204 
 A monetary value cannot be assigned to the service that the outside volunteers 
rendered in Rexburg, with Mormons and non-Mormons alike having their homes cleaned 
out in a matter of weeks rather than months.  Church members and leaders believed that 
the volunteer work also benefited the image of the church in general and became another 
tool for proselytizing and promoting good will toward church doctrine.  President Hillam 
judged that the volunteer effort put the LDS Church in a positive light.  Many of the 
volunteers not only brought their own lunches but a lunch for the people at whose home 
they worked, and Hillam concluded this small act created a bond between many people.  
He also recounted a story of volunteers from Pocatello who came to assist a man cleaning 
out his home.  The man told the volunteer that he was not a member of the church, and 
one of the volunteers replied that it did not matter, they just wanted to help him.  Hillam 
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described the volunteers “[looking] out on the porch there he was sitting in tears to think 
the people would think that much to come and help him when he wasn’t a member of the 
church.”205 
 Early in August, the volunteer efforts ended when more concrete information 
about an impending monetary settlement from the government became available.  The 
church decided it could no longer accept free labor from volunteers if the government 
agreed to make a full financial restitution to the victims.206  The organization of the 
volunteer cleanup by the priesthood leadership in the area had served several purposes, 
primarily giving flood victims a beneficial advantage in the recovery process.  Kent 
Marlor, the civil defense operations director in the area, claimed, “We are 400 percent 
ahead of schedule” due to the volunteer effort.207  The LDS Church also claimed to 
benefit from this massive organizational undertaking.  One of their stated goals for their 
welfare program was to garner positive attention for their service and values by those 
outside the church.  The Teton Dam disaster provided an opportunity to display their 
efficient organizational system and comprehensive disaster response efforts to non-
members. 
 In an interview with Bruce Blumell, HUD representative Carlos Renteria 
commented on the volunteer effort sponsored by the church and praised their 
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organizational system and desire to “help fellow humans.”208  Renteria’s interview with 
Blumell reveals that he left Idaho with an overall positive impression of the LDS 
Church’s approach to the disaster from the welfare system, priesthood organization, and 
volunteer work.  Hugh Fowler also made several appreciative remarks about working 
with the stake presidents in the area and stressed that he relied on them “quite heavily.”209  
Fowler, Renteria, and other disaster response workers noted the unique behavior of the 
LDS disaster victims who exhibited more patience and altruism than these individuals 
typically encountered in a disaster situation.  They respected the local priesthood leaders 
and the level of organization that was already in place in the flood zone, which 
contributed to a quicker and more efficient recovery effort.   
 Dell Klinger, a counselor in a stake presidency and Madison County 
Commissioner, expressed the belief of many in the church that the welfare program and 
priesthood organization had positively influenced non-members from government 
agencies and other disaster response organizations.  He claimed in his interview with 
Blumell, “these federal people are really amazed at the way the Church has organized, 
and amazed at the spirit of the people.”210  Klingler also claimed that reporters from all 
over the U.S. had visited the area and been impressed with how local leaders had handled  
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this particular disaster.211  His interview with Blumell demonstrated that both he and 
Blumell wanted it noted that those outside the church had praised and validated the work 
of the church welfare system and local priesthood leaders.  The actual articles referenced 
by Klingler, particularly one printed in Time, does not actually mention the LDS Church, 
yet Klingler and others maintained that they had the approving eyes of the nation upon 
them.212   
 This perceived success by the church with its massive volunteer clean up, 
priesthood leadership, and welfare products also convinced many priesthood leaders that 
members and leaders within the church could have improved on this success.  Stake 
President Harold Hillam of Idaho Falls had been selected to coordinate the volunteer 
efforts, with President Kimball eventually making it an official calling within the church.  
Hillam, so confident of the work the church performed during this disaster, argued that 
the church could perform the work that HUD or the Red Cross typically do in a future 
emergency response situation.  Hillam stated, “I am totally convinced that the Church can 
do whatever it wants, because of the great faith of the Saints.”  Hillam maintained that 
while the Red Cross “did a great service.  I think some of their services paralleled the 
welfare services of the Church.”  He then reaffirmed the church’s desire to remain 
independent, arguing “We maybe would have been better off if we would have taken care  
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of our own a little more with our welfare services.”213  While the stated purpose of the 
LDS Church’s welfare system and priesthood organization was to promote charity based 
on religious principles and positive exposure to non-members, many involved in the 
Teton Dam disaster also saw it as an opportunity to see whether the church could 
adequately respond to a disaster situation without having to rely too heavily on the 
federal government or other organizations.   
 President Hillam believed that the volunteer effort in eastern Idaho showed that 
the church had willing priesthood members who had a variety of practical skills.  With 
these assets, he believed the church could and should function independently of other 
organizations, particularly the government.  Many saw the Teton Dam recovery response 
by the church as a preparatory effort to increase the independence of the church.  The 
desire of the LDS Church to use its welfare system and priesthood organization to 
improve its image demonstrated a larger aspiration to achieve greater assimilation within 
American society.  Yet, these same LDS Church programs also served to maintain the 
independence and self-sufficiency of the church from American society and government.   
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
  
 President of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles Ezra Taft Benson toured the 
flood-damaged areas of eastern Idaho on June 15, 1976.  The Post-Register of Idaho Falls 
recorded his impressions as he met with flood victims and viewed the destruction.  
Speaking of the church’s welfare program and priesthood leadership, he observed that the 
way it functioned in this situation “was an inspiration to me.  I come away a better man.  
It is pure religion in action.  The Lord’s program is in full operation.”214  Benson 
expressed his approval of the way local leaders handled things in eastern Idaho.  “The 
church is organized to help.  The Lord expects the church to be a ‘light unto the world.’  
Sometimes we have to have tragedy to rise and shine.”215  For The Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-day Saints, the collapse of the Teton Dam provided an opportunity to 
demonstrate a new level of cooperation with the federal government and assimilation 
within American society.  While the exposure they believed they received for the amount 
of work and resources they dedicated to help the people of eastern Idaho recover was 
positive, most failed to note that the church had not truly changed its behavior.  The LDS 
leadership from the president of the church, Spencer W. Kimball, down to local bishops 
in the area maintained a wariness toward outside welfare and assistance, continued to 
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foster tightly-knit community ties, and relied heavily on the hierarchy of the priesthood to 
organize much of the response and recovery efforts.  The church and government 
agencies worked well together, but this success is attributed to the accommodation of 
Mormon principles and practices by the other relief agencies.  The church had changed in 
its desire for a positive perception by the government and American society only.  Its 
beliefs and practices remained intact from their nineteenth century roots.   
 Despite the catastrophic destruction of property caused by the Bureau of 
Reclamation’s critical miscalculations, most eastern Idaho Mormons did not lose their 
faith in dams or other western water projects.  An article in the January 7, 1977 edition of 
the Idaho Falls Post-Register claimed that many people supported the rebuilding of the 
Teton Dam, including Reisner’s “crotchety Mormon farmer” Willis Walker.216  Walker 
claimed, “We need that water, but if they build it next time, they should be sure they 
know what they are doing.”217  Even residents who did not support the rebuilding of the 
dam did not report complaints against the Bureau or express concern over pushing the 
environmental limits of the Upper Snake River Valley.218  The Mormon attitude toward 
the government, particularly the Bureau of Reclamation, remained similar to their pre-
1976 stance.  LDS residents continued to support the investment of federal money in 
large water projects as a way to facilitate their way of life in the arid West.  They 
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remained “dam Mormons,” wary of government welfare unless it supported the Mormon 
community. 
 The environment proved to be another force that could not change the behavior of 
the LDS Church, following attempts by the federal government and mainstream 
American culture.  Despite rampaging floodwaters and months of disarray in eastern 
Idaho, the Mormon population clung to its historic principles of independence from 
outside organizations, heavy involvement by priesthood leaders in member’s lives, and 
the promotion of community welfare above the needs of the individual.  The preexisting 
organization provided by the priesthood, the massive volunteer effort, and the welfare 
system of the church sped up the recovery process considerably and contributed to a 
positive relationship between members and outside organizations.  While HUD, FDAA, 
SBA, and the Red Cross had to adapt their usual approach to accommodate a large 
Mormon population, members and leaders of the LDS Church learned to respect and trust 
agencies outside of their church community. 
 The church achieved its stated goal of becoming a “light unto the world” through 
their welfare services employed during the Teton Dam disaster.  Thomas S. Monson, a 
member of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles since 1963 and, at the time of writing, 
serving as the president of the LDS Church, participated in several national forums on 
welfare and disaster response including President Ronald Reagan’s Task Force on Private 
Sector Initiatives.  In the course of this service, Monson frequently used the church’s 
work during the Teton Dam recovery effort to illustrate the LDS approach to welfare 
services and disaster response.  Monson claimed that President Reagan praised the LDS 
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welfare system for its emphasis on self-sufficiency.219 
 The LDS response to the Teton Dam collapse convinced some outside the church 
that the LDS welfare system and priesthood organization could effectively manage a 
disaster, but it confirmed the faith of many within the church that they could rely on this 
organization.  It convinced members that the principles of self-reliance, submission to 
priesthood authority, and sacrificing individual needs for the good of the community 
were still valid principles embraced by their chosen faith.  The same principles and 
beliefs that may have led to their support of the construction of the Teton Dam saw them 
through the demise of this edifice.  Speaking thirty-five years following the collapse of 
the dam, Henry B. Eyring (now a member of the First Presidency of the church) recalled 
his experiences in Rexburg in 1976 while serving as the President of Ricks College.  
Eyring claimed, “what happened in the flooded houses in Idaho is a manifestation of the 
Lord’s way to help those in great need become self-reliant.”220  The experiences 
following the disaster in eastern Idaho became an integral piece in the seventy-six year 
history of the LDS Church’s Welfare system and validated members’ beliefs that the 
Mormon approach to addressing their temporal needs and concerns was as God would 
have it.   
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